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This Article represents the first attempt to systematically 
assess and compare the goals of international criminal courts to 
one another. To compare them, it focuses on their expected value. 
This is the value of the benefit that would occur if the goal were 
to be achieved, multiplied by the likelihood that it will be 
achieved. This approach allows for goals of differing value and 
likelihood of achievement to be compared to one another. The goal 
with the highest expected value is the goal that is most important 
and that international criminal courts should prioritize. 
This Article demonstrates that it is possible to establish a 
hierarchy of the goals of international criminal courts. Moreover, 
it finds that the most important goal is the prevention of 
violations of international criminal law. This is perhaps 
surprising given that many scholars appear to have concluded 
that prevention is not achievable. Nevertheless, preventing 
violations would have enormous value. Perhaps more 
importantly, recent empirical research strongly suggests that 
courts can prevent violations. The result is that prevention is 
moderately likely to occur and has an extremely high value when 
it does occur. As such, it has a higher expected value than any of 
the other goals commonly attributed to international tribunals 
including retribution, establishing the historical record, 
providing closure for victims, or fostering post-conflict 
 
  Associate Professor of Law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, 
Illinois. This Article was greatly improved by the comments of those who read 
earlier versions, including Professors Daryl Lim, Margaret Ryznar, Jonathan 
Witmer-Rich, Alexander Greenawalt, and the participants in the 2017 ASIL 
Midwest Interest Group Annual Conference and the 2017 ASIL Midyear 
Research Forum. Any mistakes that remain are mine. This Article was made 
possible by a summer research grant from the John Marshall Law School. 
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reconciliation. Accordingly, international criminal courts should 
make preventing violations their priority. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly ten years ago, Professor Damaška realized that there 
is a significant lacuna in discussions about the goals of 
international criminal courts: while there is a great deal of 
literature about particular goals, there has been no attempt to 
establish a hierarchy of those goals.1 As a result, much of the 
literature operates in a vacuum. While many scholars have 
argued that a particular goal, considered on its own, is the most 
important, there has been virtually no discussion of the value of 
each goal relative to the others. As this Article demonstrates, 
there is much that can be learned about the goals of 
international criminal courts by considering all of them 
simultaneously and comparing them to one another. 
First, having an established hierarchy of those goals brings 
clarity to an important theoretical question. The extensive 
literature about the goals of international criminal courts 
demonstrates their importance.2 Given their importance, it is 
somewhat surprising that nobody has tried to articulate a formal 
hierarchy of those goals. By establishing such a hierarchy, this 
Article represents a significant contribution to our knowledge 
about international criminal tribunals. 
Second, having an established hierarchy will benefit both 
international courts and the states that fund them. Courts have 
limited resources and cannot pursue all of the goals that have 
been set for them.3 Placing those goals in a hierarchy will allow 
courts to focus their resources on the goals that will yield the 
most value. This should lead, in time, to courts being more 
successful in achieving their goals. Ultimately, this will also 
benefit those states that fund international criminal courts.4 
 
 1. See Mirjan Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal 
Justice?, 83 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 329, 331 (2008) (“The list of goals 
proclaimed by international criminal courts and their affiliates is very long.”); 
Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 
427, 428 (2004) (“A long list of purposes has been ascribed to the ICTY and the 
ICC, and other similar tribunals . . . .”). 
 2. The breadth of the literature about the goals of international criminal 
courts can be seen by looking at the sources cited during the initial discussion 
of those goals. See infra Section III. 
 3. See infra Section III. 
 4. See Stuart Ford, What Investigative Resources Does the International 
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This Article represents the first attempt to systematically 
assess and compare the goals of international criminal courts to 
one another. To compare them, it focuses on their expected 
value. This is the value of the benefit that would occur if the goal 
were to be achieved multiplied by the likelihood that it will be 
achieved.5 This approach allows for goals of differing value and 
likelihood of achievement to be compared to one another. The 
goal with the highest expected value is the goal that is most 
important and that international criminal courts should 
prioritize.6 
This Article demonstrates that it is possible to establish a 
hierarchy of the goals of international criminal law.7 Moreover, 
it argues that the most important goal in the hierarchy is the 
prevention of violations of international criminal law.8 This may 
be surprising given that many scholars appear to have concluded 
in recent years that prevention is unachievable.9 Nevertheless, 
it is clear that preventing violations would have enormous 
value.10 Perhaps more importantly, recent empirical research 
strongly suggests that courts can prevent violations.11 The result 
is that prevention is moderately likely to occur and has an 
extremely high value when it does occur. As such it has a higher 
expected value than any of the other goals commonly attributed 
to international tribunals including retribution, establishing the 
historical record, providing closure for victims, or fostering post-
conflict reconciliation.12 Accordingly, international criminal 
courts should make preventing violations their priority. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Section II describes the 
outputs of international criminal courts. Section III discusses 
the most-commonly articulated goals that states, scholars and 
commentators have urged courts to pursue. The methodology for 
this Article is presented in Section IV. Section V evaluates each 
of the goals of international tribunals for both how often the goal 
 
Criminal Court Need to Succeed?: A Gravity-Based Approach, 16 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 70 (2017) (arguing that states have a vested interest 
in the success of the courts they fund and that court success benefits funding 
states). 
 5. See infra Section IV. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See infra Section VI. 
 8. See infra Table 3. 
 9. See infra Section V.H.2. 
 10. See infra Section V.H.8–13. 
 11. See infra Section V.H.4–7. 
 12. See infra Section VI. 
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is likely to be achieved and what the benefit the goal would 
confer if it were achieved. These factors are used to determine 
the expected value of each goal. Section VI presents the results 
of the assessments in Section V and turns them into a formal 
hierarchy of the goals of international criminal courts. This 
Article’s conclusions and some recommendations for future 
research appear in Section VII. 
II. THE OUTPUT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS 
The principal work of international criminal tribunals is to 
determine the guilt or innocence of individuals accused of 
violating international criminal law.13 They do this by 
conducting trials.14 The trials are thus their most important 
output.15 But if the trials (and subsequent incarceration of those 
 
 13. See Shahram Dana, Turning Point for International Justice?, in XI 
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 962, 972 
(Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2007) (“The primary function of the 
international criminal tribunal is to determine the criminal responsibility and 
punishment of those individuals found guilty of the crimes under its 
jurisdiction.”); O-Gon Kwon, The Challenge of An International Criminal Trial 
as Seen from the Bench, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 360, 
373 (2007) (“The task of determining guilt or innocence must take precedence 
over other, not strictly judicial, considerations.”); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, 
Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48 
VA. J. INT’L L. 529, 534 (2008) (arguing that “the main function of trials is to 
determine individual culpability and to assess appropriate punishment through 
a fair process.”). 
 14. U.N. Secretary-General, ¶	20, U.N. Doc A/C.5/52/4 (Oct. 21, 1997) 
(“[Chambers] performs the fundamental core activity of the Tribunal, that is, 
the trial and determination of guilt or innocence of persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law within the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia.”); Adrian Fulford, The Reflections of a Trial Judge, 22 
CRIMINAL L.F. 215, 216 (2011) (“We are first, foremost and last a criminal court: 
our core business is to process criminal trials. All the rest, and I hasten to add 
some of the rest is very important indeed (such as our deterrent potential, 
reparations to victims and outreach), is secondary to the Court’s obligation to 
investigate, arrest and try alleged criminals.”). 
 15. The trials are the outputs of the ICC’s process because they are the 
direct result of the ICC’s operations. See Yuval Shany, Assessing the 
Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AMERICAN J. 
INT’L L. 225, 248 (2012). They should not be confused with the outcomes of the 
court, which would be the effects of its outputs on the external state of the world. 
Id. This distinction between outputs and outcomes is very important. See infra 
Section III (arguing that states would not pay for international tribunals solely 
to generate their direct outputs and that such courts are unsustainable unless 
they can also achieve certain outcomes in the external world). 
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found guilty) were all that such tribunals accomplished, it is 
unlikely that the international community would continue to 
fund them. This is true for three reasons: trials are very rare, 
very expensive, and very complex. 
First, trials at international criminal courts are extremely 
rare. Over the course of about twenty years, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted 161 
people, but has tried only 98.16 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the next largest international 
tribunal, indicted ninety-one people, but has only tried seventy-
five.17 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) originally 
indicted thirteen individuals, but only brought ten of them to a 
trial.18 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) charged eight people, but has only tried three.19 In the 
 
 16. See Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, http://www.icty.org/en/content/
infographic-icty-facts-figures (showing that the ICTY has sentenced eighty 
individuals and acquitted eighteen more). Of course, that figure does not 
completely describe the ICTY’s workload. There are ongoing proceedings 
against another twelve individuals, thirteen individuals have been transferred 
to domestic jurisdictions for trial, and proceedings were terminated against 
another thirty-six individuals. Id. Even if you include all of these people, 
however, the ICTY only indicted 161 individuals. 
 17. See The ICTR in Brief, International Criminal tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal (showing that the ICTR has 
indicted ninety-one people, of whom sixty-one were convicted and sentenced, 
fourteen were acquitted, and the remaining individuals either died, are still 
fugitives, or had their cases referred to national jurisdictions). 
 18. See Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.rscsl.org/ (noting that 
“[i]n March 2003 the Prosecutor brought the first of 13 indictments against 
leaders of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), and then-
Liberian President Charles Taylor. Ten persons were brought to trial. Two 
others died, one of them before proceedings could commence (RUF Leader Foday 
Sankoh) and one outside the jurisdiction of the Court (RUF Battlefield 
Commander Sam Bockarie). A third, (AFRC Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma), 
fled Sierra Leone shortly before he was indicted. While some evidence suggests 
that Koroma is dead, it is not considered conclusive and he is therefore officially 
considered to be at large.”). 
 19. The ECCC initially charged five former members of the Khmer Rouge, 
but one of them subsequently died and another was ruled unfit to stand trial. 
See Christoph Sperfeldt, From the Margins of Internationalized Criminal 
Justice: Lessons Learned at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1111, 1113 (2013). In 2009, the Co-
Prosecutors requested the initiation of investigations into five additional 
suspects in what came to be known as Case 003 and Case 004. See ECCC, Case 
003, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/286. One individual was 
subsequently charged in connection with Case 003. Id. Two individuals were 
charged in connection with Case 004. See ECCC, Case 004, http://www.eccc.gov.
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thirteen years since the International Criminal Court (ICC) was 
established, the ICC has issued arrest warrants for forty people, 
of which, twelve have either been tried or are in the midst of a 
trial.20 The result is that only about 300 individuals have been 
indicted by international criminal courts since the mid-1990s. 
Slightly less than 200 of them have had their guilt adjudicated. 
Domestic jurisdictions adjudicate far more criminal cases 
than international tribunals can ever hope to. For example, 
there are more than 20 million new criminal cases opened each 
year in the United States.21 The courts in England and Wales22 
open approximately 1.7 million new criminal cases each year.23 
Each year, the Canadian courts complete about 400,000 criminal 
cases24 and more than 700,000 new criminal cases are initiated 
in Australia.25 
 
kh/en/case/topic/98. As a result, the ECCC eventually charged eight people, but 
only three people were actually tried. Kang Guek Eav alias Duch was tried and 
convicted in Case 001. See ECCC, Case 001, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/
case/topic/1. Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were tried and convicted in Case 
002/01. See ECCC, Case 002, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/2. Trials 
have not begun in Case 003 or Case 004. See ECCC, Case 003, 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/286; ECCC, Case 004, http://www.eccc.
gov.kh/en/case/topic/98. 
 20. See List of people indicted in the International Criminal Court, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_indicted_in_the_Inter
national_Criminal_Court (last vistited Jan. 8, 2018). Of the rest, charges have 
been withdrawn against a number of them, some have died, and the remainder 
are fugitives. Id. 
 21. See R. LAFOUNTAIN, R. SCHAUFFLER, S. STRICKLAND, S. GIBSON, & A. 
MASON, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE 
COURT CASELOADS (National Center for State Courts 2011), at 20 (indicating 
that in 2009 there were more than 20 million new criminal cases filed in state 
courts in the United States). 
 22. The crown courts and magistrates’ courts represent the main criminal 
courts. See Ministry of Justice, Criminal court statistics quarterly, England and 
Wales, October to December 2015, dated March 31, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/512100/bulletin.pdf. 
 23. The magistrates’ courts receive approximately 400,000 criminal cases 
per quarter, while the crown courts—which hear more serious cases—receive 
approximately 30,000 cases per quarter. Id. at fig. 1 (Magistrates’ courts 
caseload) and fig. 2 (Crown courts caseload). Scotland and Northern Ireland 
have their own separate criminal court systems and report their caseloads 
separately. 
 24. See Ashley Maxwell, Adult Criminal Court Statistics in Canada 
2013/2014, Statistics Canada, Sept. 28, 2015, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-
002-x/2015001/article/14226-eng.htm. The number of completed criminal cases 
in Canada has fluctuated between 360,000 and 410,000 for the last decade. See 
id. at Chart 1. 
 25. See AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY, AUSTRALIAN CRIME: 
FACTS & FIGURES 2014 59, (2014), http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/
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Second, trials at international tribunals are very 
expensive.26 All told, international criminal courts spent more 
than $6 billion between 1993 and 2015.27 This amounts to almost 
$30 million dollars spent per individual tried. Most domestic 
trials cost far less.28 
Third, international trials are extremely complex. For 
example, the average trial at the ICTY took 171 trial days to 
complete, and involved the testimony of 121 witnesses and the 
entry into evidence of more than 2,000 exhibits.29 Trials at other 
international criminal courts have a similar level of 
complexity.30 Domestic criminal trials, on the other hand, take 
much less time. In fact, the majority of criminal trials heard in 
federal district courts in the United States take less than one 
trial day to complete.31 And less than one half of one percent of 
federal criminal trials took more than twenty days to complete.32 
The reality of spending more than $6 billion to try about 200 
individuals has led to claims that international criminal 
tribunals are too slow, too expensive, and too inefficient.33 I have 
shown elsewhere that the conventional wisdom regarding the 
 
facts/2014/facts_and_figures_2014.pdf. 
 26. See Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal 
Courts, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2014) [hereinafter Ford, Complexity and 
Efficiency]. The ICTY will cost more than $2.7 billion between 1993 and 2017. 
Id. at 36. The ICTR is expected to cost about $1.75 billion over roughly the same 
period. See also Stuart Ford, How Leadership in International Criminal Law is 
Shifting from the United States to Europe and Asia: An Analysis of Spending on 
and Contributions to International Criminal Courts, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 953, 
973 (2011) [hereinafter Ford, How Leadership is Shifting]. The International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has cost at least $1.6 billion since 2002. Id.at 961. 
 27. Id. at 960. 
 28. Data on the costs of domestic criminal trials is extremely hard to come 
by. See Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26, at 45 (noting the 
difficulty of finding data on domestic criminal systems). Nevertheless, murder 
trials in the United States seem to usually cost hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. Id. at 53–55 (discussing the costs of murder trials in North Carolina, 
Maryland and Kansas). It seems safe to assume that most criminal trials cost 
less than the typical murder trial. 
 29. See Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26, at Table 2. 
 30. Id. at 31–32. 
 31. Id. at 32–33. 
 32. Id. at 33. 
 33. See, e.g., Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International 
Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541, 543 (2004) (arguing that there is a 
“pervasive” dissatisfaction among states with international criminal tribunals 
and a “perception” that their cost is not justified by the small number and 
lengthy nature of the trials that take place). 
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efficiency of international criminal tribunals is wrong,34 but it is 
true that trials at international tribunals are very expensive and 
very rare. Indeed, if the only thing that international courts 
accomplished was to try a handful of very expensive cases, with 
no other effect on the world beyond the incarceration of the 
accused if he or she was found guilty, it is unlikely that the 
international community would continue to establish and fund 
them. 
At first, this claim may seem strange given that states 
manifestly do establish and fund international criminal courts 
and their main work consists of trying individuals accused of 
serious violations of international criminal law.35 But states 
expect courts to accomplish far more than just trying a handful 
of individuals—no matter how deserving those individuals are of 
punishment. Indeed, states attach a relatively low value to the 
determination of guilt or innocence and the imposition of an 
appropriate sentence. Rather, states fund international 
tribunals primarily because of the other goals they hope them to 
accomplish.36 
There is a critical difference between a court’s outputs (the 
work it performs) and its outcomes (the impact of its work on the 
world).37 States do not fund international courts so that those 
courts can produce particular outputs.38 Rather, they fund 
courts because they believe the courts will lead to particular 
outcomes in the external world.39 Trials are the principal output 
of international criminal courts,40 but states would not fund such 
courts solely to conduct trials if those trials did not have some 
larger impact on the world. 
 For example, Ralph Zacklin41 argued that states became 
dissatisfied with the ad hoc tribunals because their costs were 
 
 34. See generally Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26. 
 35. Understanding the International Criminal Court, ICC at 1, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf. 
 36. See Shany, supra note 15, at 230. 
 37. See supra note 15 (explaining the difference between outputs and 
outcomes). 
 38. Cf. Shany, supra note 15, at 249 (“From a goal-based perspective, 
outputs are mere instruments or means to attain social outcomes, and thus 
represent a less important object of study than outcomes.”). 
 39. See Shany, supra note 15, at 230 (arguing that courts are viewed as 
effective when they achieve their desired outcomes). 
 40. See supra text accompanying notes 13–15. 
 41. Ralph Zacklin was Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs at the 
United Nations and played a key role in development of the ad hoc tribunals. 
See Zacklin, supra note 33. 
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far greater than their tangible accomplishments42 and that the 
courts represented an approach that was “no longer politically 
or financially viable.”43 Zacklin’s argument assumes that states 
decide whether to support courts by weighing the costs of 
international tribunals against the benefit to be derived from 
their impact on the world. And, indeed, it is widely accepted that 
states are rational actors who make decisions on whether to 
create or become members of international organizations based 
on a calculation of the costs and benefits of membership.44 
Ultimately, Zacklin concluded that states would not continue to 
fund international criminal courts solely to conduct slow, 
expensive trials unless they could show some impact on the 
external world.45 
That does not mean that states will not found or become 
members of international criminal courts. Indeed, since 
Zacklin’s article was written, 124 states have become members 
of the International Criminal Court.46 So, it is clear that states 
are still willing to both found and join international tribunals. 
However, states will not do so solely so that courts can 
adjudicate the guilt or innocence of a handful of accused; the 
expense must be justified by something beyond just carrying out 
trials.47 
 
 42. See id. at 543 (arguing that most states felt the cost of the courts “is not 
wholly justified” because of the inability of the courts to fulfill their purpose of 
“bringing to justice those responsible for the most serious crimes in a timely and 
expeditious manner.”). 
 43. Id. at 545. See also Alex Whiting, In International Criminal 
Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 
24 (2009) (arguing that the “conventional wisdom among policymakers, 
practitioners and commentators,” both academic and popular, was that 
prosecutions at international criminal courts have been far too slow to justify 
their expense). 
 44. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through 
Formal International Organizations, 42 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 6 (1998) (“We 
assume, for simplicity, that states are the principal actors in world politics and 
that they use IOs to create social orderings appropriate to their pursuit of 
shared goals . . . .We start with the pursuit of efficiency and employ the logic of 
transaction costs economics and rational choice . . . .”); Barbara Koremenos et 
al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 62 
(2001) (“Our basic presumption, grounded in the broad tradition of rational-
choice analysis, is that states use international institutions to further their own 
goals, and they design institutions accordingly.”) (emphasis in original). 
 45. See Zacklin, supra note 33, at 545. 
 46. ICC, Joining the International Criminal Court Why does it matter? 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/Universality_Eng.pdf (“124 
states are parties to the Rome Statute.”). 
 47. See Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive 
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III. THE GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS 
The goals of international criminal courts are much broader 
than simply conducting trials, and it is achievement of these 
goals that motivates states to join a court.48 Professor Shany has 
argued that this is essentially how all international 
organizations operate. Their outputs are the means by which 
their goals are achieved,49 but ultimately, it is the achievement 
of those goals that matters, not the particular outputs 
themselves. And indeed, all international criminal courts are 
premised on the idea that conducting trials has some effect on 
the world beyond just determining the guilt or innocence of the 
accused.50 
For example, the Rome Statute of the ICC argues that it will 
“contribute to the prevention of” serious violations of 
international criminal law.51 It also establishes a goal of 
“put[ting] an end to impunity.”52 Other international tribunals 
have been given similar goals. For example, the United Nations 
Security Council asserted that the ICTY would contribute to 
ending widespread violations of international law and that it 
would “contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.”53 It made similar claims when it created the ICTR.54 
These are not the only goals that have been attributed to 
international criminal courts.55 Over the last twenty years, 
 
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 269-70, 
276 (2012) (arguing that retribution alone cannot justify the ICC’s work 
suggesting that states are not fundamentally retributivists and that they are 
not willing to pay for international trials if their only purpose is to punish the 
guilty). 
 48. Cf. Shany, supra note 15, at 230 (arguing that the effectiveness of 
international courts should be measured by whether they achieve their goals 
rather than by whether they produce a particular output). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Cf. id. at 248 (defining the outcome of an international court as the 
effect of its outputs on the external state of the world). 
 51. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., July 17, 1998, 
37 I.L.M. 1002, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See S.C. Res. 808 (Feb 22, 1993). 
 54. See S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (arguing that the ICTR could contribute 
to putting an end to crimes, be an effective measure to bring to justice those 
persons responsible for them, ensure that crimes were effective redressed, and 
“contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace”). 
 55. This Article will often use the terminology of goals rather than 
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courts, states, and commentators have identified many potential 
goals for international tribunals.56 The most commonly-
articulated goals are: 
 preventing violations of international criminal 
law;57 
 ending impunity for past violations;58 
 maintaining or restoring international peace and 
security;59 
 
outcomes to describe the effect of tribunals on the world because this is how 
most of the literature frames the issue. But it is worth noting that the two terms 
are largely synonymous. Compare supra note 15 (defining outcomes as the 
effects of a court’s work on the external world) with OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 
NEW OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds., 
3d ed. 2010) (defining a goal as “the object of a person’s ambition or effort; an 
aim or desired result”). 
 56. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331 (“The list of goals proclaimed by 
international criminal courts and their affiliates is very long.”); see also Schrag, 
supra note 1, at 428 (“A long list of purposes has been ascribed to the ICTY and 
the ICC, and other similar tribunals . . . .”). 
 57. See supra Section III (noting that the Preamble to the Rome Statute 
explicitly identifies prevention as one of the goals of the ICC). See also 
deGuzman supra note 47 at 306–08 (noting that deterrence is “frequently 
invoked” as a justification for the work of international tribunals); Justin Levitt, 
Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law – II: The Promises of 
International Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1961 (2001) (“The specific 
aim of prosecution that tribunal affiliates recite most frequently is the 
prevention of future violations of international humanitarian law.”). 
 58. See supra Section III (noting that the Rome Statute explicitly identifies 
ending impunity and ensuring effective prosecution as one of the goals of the 
ICC). See also William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The 
International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of 
International Justice, 49 HARV. J. INT’L L. 53, 68-73 (2008) (arguing that the 
ICC can help end impunity by encouraging domestic systems to undertake 
prosecutions of international crimes); id. at 107 (“The International Criminal 
Court’s core mission is to end impunity for the most serious international 
crimes.”); Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that international courts are 
supposed to “end impunity for violations, especially for senior political and 
military leaders”). 
 59. See supra text accompanying notes 53–54. See also Turner, supra note 
13, at 537–39; Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Justice 
Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 7 (2001) (arguing that the 
indictment and prosecution of “leaders with criminal dispositions and a vested 
interest in conflict makes a positive contribution to post-conflict peace 
building”); Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 739 (“The most important function of 
international criminal justice is the restoration of peace.”). 
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 establishing a reliable historical record;60 
 providing closure or redress for victims;61 
 expressing condemnation of crimes that are 
abhorrent;62 
 fostering post-conflict reconciliation;63 
 developing international criminal law;64 and 
 assigning responsibility for wrongs and 
punishing the guilty (i.e., retribution).65 
These are not all of the goals that have been attributed to 
 
 60. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331. See also Janine Natalya Clark, Plea 
Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
415, 425 (2009) (arguing that the ICTY “considers one of its primary purposes 
to be the creation of a historical record”); Regina E. Rauxloh, Negotiated History: 
The Historical Record in International Criminal Law and Plea Bargaining, 10 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 739, 740 (2010) (arguing that establishing “a historical 
record of the roots and the development of the violence is one of the main 
functions of all international criminal courts”); Turner, supra note 13, at 539–
41. 
 61. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 333–34 (“An attempt to restore the 
dignity of victims and to provide them, or their families, with a forum in which 
to express their suffering is, of course, an ennobling humanitarian impulse.”); 
Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that international courts are supposed to 
be able to “bring repose to victims” and “provide a safe forum for victims to tell 
their stories”); Turner, supra note 13, at 542–43. 
 62. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (describing the “didactic objective of 
improving respect for human rights by expressing outrage for their violation”); 
de Guzman, supra note 47, at 312–19 (arguing that the ICC should use its 
prosecutions to express condemnation of wrongdoing). See also Schrag, supra 
note 1, at 428 (arguing that the goals of international tribunals include “public 
education in general” as well as “illuminat[ing] explanations about what caused 
the violations and illustrat[ing] particular patterns of conduct”). 
 63. See Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy 
of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional 
Justice Mechanisms, 45 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405, 463–75 (2012) 
(arguing that international criminal courts can foster post-conflict 
reconciliation); de Guzman, supra note 47, at 311, Levitt, supra note 57, at 
1970–71. 
 64. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that one purpose attributed to 
international tribunals is to “develop and expand the application and 
interpretation of international law and norms”). 
 65. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331; de Guzman, supra note 47, at 301–
05; Levitt, supra note 57, at 1969. 
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international tribunals,66 but they are the most common. 
As others, including Professor Damaška, have noted, this 
list of goals is long and unwieldy.67 Moreover, some of the goals 
may contradict one another.68 For example, the goal of ending 
impunity for past violations may be in tension with the goal of 
maintaining peace.69 Similarly, there may be tension between 
the desire to create an accurate historical record and the court’s 
focus on determining the guilt of the accused.70 The large 
number of goals, as well as their possible inconsistency, has led 
to pessimism about whether courts can achieve all of them.71 
Professor Damaška realized that another problem is that 
there is no generally accepted hierarchy of the goals.72 This is a 
serious problem because, without any agreement on relative 
importance, courts cannot know which goals to prioritize. Given 
that some of the goals may be in tension with each other73 and 
that international tribunals have limited resources with which 
to work,74 they cannot be expected to maximize their 
 
 66. Minna Schrag, for example, lists fifteen separate goals in her article 
about the ICTY. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428. 
 67. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331 (“It does not require much pause to 
realize that the task of fulfilling all of these self-imposed demands is truly 
gargantuan.”). 
 68. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428–29 (“The experience of the ICTY has 
shown that there is inherent tension among some of [the court’s] goals . . . .”). 
 69. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331–32. See also Schrag, supra note 1, 
at 429 (noting that some early critics of the ICTY argued that its attempts to 
investigate violations were making it harder to achieve peace in the Balkans). 
 70. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 332–33. See also Turner, supra note 13, 
at 534 (noting that some theorists have argued that determining guilt or 
innocence is the only appropriate goal of international tribunals and that other 
goals, “such as the establishment of a thorough historical record or full public 
reckoning with the actions of a previous regime, are to be left in the 
background”); id. at 540–41 (noting the tension between establishing an 
accurate historical record and the trial’s focus on determining the guilt or 
innocence of the accused). 
 71. See generally Damaška, supra note 1 (arguing that international 
criminal courts are unlikely to be able to achieve their many goals). See, e.g., de 
Guzman, supra note 47, at 301–09 (arguing that the ICC will have difficulty 
achieving the goals of retribution and deterrence). 
 72. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (“Managing tensions among the 
goals, and dealing with the courts’ limitations in attaining some of them, would 
be greatly facilitated if a set of priorities existed based on an understanding of 
the relative weights of competing goals.”). See also Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 
(noting that there is a “lack of consensus” about which of the goals should be 
given priority). 
 73. See supra text accompanying notes 68–70. 
 74. See Burke-White, supra note 58, at 53–54 (noting the contrast between 
the high expectations of the ICC and the reality that the ICC has limited 
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contributions to all of the goals simultaneously.75 Rather, if they 
are to have an impact on the world, they must focus their 
resources where they will do the most good. Thus, having an 
accepted hierarchy among the goals would permit courts to make 
decisions about how to allocate their resources so as to maximize 
their effect on the most important goals.76 This Article seeks to 
guide courts in their decision-making by demonstrating that 
there is a discernable hierarchy and that some goals should be 
given priority over others.77 
IV. METHODOLOGY  
Producing a hierarchy of the goals of international criminal 
courts requires a methodology. While there are a number of 
different methodologies that could be used to create such a 
hierarchy, this Article will use the expected value of the various 
goals to rank them. The expected value of a particular goal is 
defined as the value of the benefit that would occur if that goal 
were achieved multiplied by the likelihood that the benefit will 
occur. This permits the benefit of achieving different goals to be 
discounted by the likelihood that such goals will actually be 
achieved. Thus, a goal with a modest actual benefit but a high 
likelihood of achievement might have a higher expected value 
than a goal that had a high actual benefit (if that goal were 
achieved) but which was extremely unlikely to occur. Using this 
methodology, the goal that yields the greatest expected value is 
the most important goal and the one that international tribunals 
should strive to achieve. 
This Article will not, however, calculate an exact expected 
value for any of the possible goals of international criminal 
tribunals. There is too much uncertainty about both how likely 
it is that particular goals can be achieved as well as what 
 
resources and modest capabilities); id. at 64–67. 
 75. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 301 (noting that the “resource 
limitations” of international tribunals require them to make decisions about 
which cases to prosecute but that to do so they must first be able to identify 
which goals are most important). 
 76. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339; deGuzman, supra note 47, at 267 
(noting that “the international community has provided the [ICC] virtually no 
guidance about what goals it should seek” and that the lack of priorities 
represents a “serious challenge” for the court). 
 77. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 344 (arguing that, even if it is not 
possible to formally rank all the goals of international criminal courts, it would 
still be advantageous to identify the most important one). 
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benefits would occur if the goal was achieved to assign specific 
values to the different goals. Instead, this Article will categorize 
whether the likelihood of achieving a particular goal is likely, 
moderately likely, unlikely, or extremely unlikely. Similarly, the 
benefit of achieving a particular goal (assuming it can be 
attained) will be categorized as low, moderate, high, or 
extremely high. Each goal can then be placed in a matrix that 
allows its expected value to be assessed against the other goals.78 
Table 1 (below) represents such a matrix. 
 















    
High 
    
Moderate 
    
Low 





 Likelihood of benefit occurring 
 
Goals that appear in the bottom left corner of the matrix 
have both an extremely low likelihood of occurring and a low 
value when they do occur. They will have the lowest expected 
value. Goals that appear in the upper right corner of the matrix 
are both likely to occur and have an extremely high value when 
they do occur. They will have the highest expected value. 
The process of categorizing the likelihood of achieving a 
particular goal and the benefit that would accrue if that goal 
were achieved will be done based on: 1) inferences drawn from 
the theory underpinning each of the goals; and 2) the existing 
literature about the achievement of those goals. Quantitative 
data will be incorporated where available, but much of the 
 
 78. This is analogous to a risk matrix, which is a tool used to manage risks 
in organizational settings. See Louis Anthony Cox, Jr., What’s Wrong with Risk 
Matrices?, 28 RISK ANALYSIS 497, 497–98 (2008). 
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analysis will be qualitative rather than quantitative because 
there have been few empirical studies of the goals of 
international criminal courts. 
While there are other approaches one could use to evaluate 
the relative importance of the goals of international criminal 
courts, a methodology focused on expected value was chosen 
because it is consistent with how states make decisions about 
whether to support such courts. States are rational actors who 
weigh the expected benefits of membership when deciding 
whether to join and support international courts.79 States are 
also the most important stakeholders because without their 
political and financial support international criminal courts 
could not function.80 Thus, identifying and pursuing the goal 
with the greatest expected value maximizes the likelihood that 
states will continue to support international tribunals. 
The goals that are most important to states would also 
result in enormous public welfare gains if they could be 
achieved.81 While states value these gains, the principal 
beneficiaries would be individuals. So, while this Article focuses 
on which goals states value, most of the benefits would accrue to 
society as a whole. 
The term “goal” is central to this Article and it is important 
to note the difference between a goal and a mechanism for 
achieving that goal. A goal is a particular aim or desired result.82 
In contrast, a mechanism is a process by which something—in 
this Article, a particular goal—is brought about.83 Many of the 
“goals” that have been advanced by scholars are not really goals 
at all. Rather, they are mechanisms by which some other goal is 
to be achieved. For example, scholars have argued that courts 
should express condemnation of abhorrent acts,84 but this “goal” 
 
 79. See supra Section III. 
 80. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 268 (noting that without the support 
of states, the ICC would have “no funding, no defendants to prosecute, and no 
evidence with which to conduct prosecutions”). 
 81. See infra Section V.H. 
 82. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, supra note 55 (defining a goal as “the object 
of a person’s ambition or effort; an aim or desired result”). 
 83. Id. (defining mechanism as “a natural or established process by which 
something takes place or is brought about”). 
 84. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (describing the “didactic objective of 
improving respect for human rights by expressing outrage for their violation”); 
de Guzman, supra note 47, at 312–19 (arguing that the ICC should use its 
prosecutions to express condemnation of wrongdoing). See also Schrag, supra 
note 1, at 428 (arguing that the goals of international tribunals include “public 
education in general” as well as “illuminat[ing] explanations about what caused 
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is not usually meant as an end in itself. Instead, the expressive 
condemnation of morally abhorrent conduct is intended to help 
establish and strengthen norms that will result in compliance 
with international law.85 In effect, expressive condemnation is a 
mechanism by which courts can prevent violations of 
international criminal law. 
This distinction between goals and mechanisms is very 
important for calculating the expected value of the goals of 
international criminal courts. To the extent that one of the goals 
discussed in this Article is principally a mechanism to achieve 
some other goal, it often has a low expected value. This is 
because it has little value as an end in itself, even though it 
might be a useful mechanism for achieving some other goal. To 
use the example above, if expressing condemnation of morally 
abhorrent acts is really a mechanism for preventing violations,86 
then the value of any violations that are prevented is part of the 
value of achieving the goal of prevention. Thus, expressing 
condemnation would increase the expected value of prevention 
if it increased the likelihood of prevention, but it would not 
increase its own expected value. The expected value of 
expressing condemnation is limited to the value that 
condemnation has as an end in itself. This would be the value it 
would have if it had no other effect on the world—its intrinsic 
value. 
V. ASSESSING THE EXPECTED VALUE OF THE GOALS 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
This Section will provide the information necessary to 
evaluate the expected value of the nine goals of international 
criminal tribunals identified above in Section III. Each sub-
section below will lay out the theory underpinning one of those 
goals, then use that theory as well as the existing literature to 
assess both the likelihood that the goal can be achieved and the 
benefit that would occur if the goal were achieved. The sub-
sections have been arranged roughly in order from the goal most 
likely to be achieved to the goal least likely to be achieved. 
 
the violations and illustrat[ing] particular patterns of conduct”). 
 85. See infra Section V.D.3. 
 86. See supra Section IV.7. 
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A. RETRIBUTION 
At least one of the goals of international tribunals is likely 
to occur each time there is a trial—that of retribution. The 
principal purpose of a trial is, after all, to determine whether the 
accused is guilty.87 If guilt is established, the court must impose 
an appropriate punishment,88 which is determined by the 
gravity of the crimes and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person.89 This is a well-established way to determine 
the appropriate retribution.90 Thus, trials at international 
tribunals are likely to accomplish the goal of assigning 
responsibility for serious violations of international criminal law 
and punishing those found guilty.91 Of course, it is not 
guaranteed that trials can effectively assign responsibility or 
provide adequate retribution,92 but it appears that courts are 
more likely to achieve this goal than any of the other potential 
goals.93 Consequently, it is likely that this goal can be achieved 
in most trials. 
Having assessed the likelihood that retribution can be 
achieved in any particular trial, the next step is to determine the 
value of the benefit that occurs when it is achieved. Retribution 
is often alleged to be one of the most important goals of domestic 
criminal law,94 and the staff of international tribunals often view 
it as a primary goal of their work.95 States, however, assign it a 
 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 13–15. 
 88. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 77 (noting that punishments 
for a conviction can include imprisonment, fines and the forfeiture of property). 
 89. See, e.g., id. art. 78(1). 
 90. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 301 (noting that the appropriate 
retribution is determined by the seriousness of the harm caused by the crime 
and the culpability of the defendant). 
 91. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1969. 
 92. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 302 (noting that many “scholars who 
have studied the question” have expressed doubts about the ICC’s ability to 
serve retributive ends). See also Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary 
Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 684-5 (2007) 
(arguing that sentences at international criminal courts are too lenient given 
the magnitude of the wrongs); Levitt, supra note 57, at 1970 (noting that certain 
practices, like the use of plea bargains, can undermine retributive aims and that 
the punishments that international courts can give seem “inadequate” for 
effective retribution given the “moral magnitude” of the crimes). 
 93. See infra Section VI. 
 94. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 280 (noting that the most commonly-
articulated purposes of domestic prosecutions are deterrence and retribution). 
 95. Id., at n. 69 (noting that five current and former chief prosecutors at 
international tribunals expressed the view that retribution was a primary goal 
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low value,96 and retribution alone cannot justify spending on 
international courts.97 
B. ESTABLISHING AN ACCURATE HISTORICAL RECORD 
The next goal to consider—establishing an accurate 
historical record—is also closely related to the trial. After all, it 
is primarily through the trial that the court determines the guilt 
or innocence of the accused. This is done through the 
presentation of evidence.98 To convict the accused, the evidence 
must be sufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the accused committed the crimes.99 Thus, a conviction 
should be supported by evidence that is strong enough to 
withstand scrutiny.100 Moreover, the end result of the trial is a 
formal record, which is meant to be “complete” and “accurately 
reflect[] the proceedings.”101 This could serve as the basis for an 
accurate historical record.102 There are a number of reasons to 
believe that the expected value of this goal is quite low, however. 
First, establishing an accurate historical record is difficult and 
therefore achievement of this goal is only moderately likely. 
More importantly, however, the value of achieving this goal as 
an end in itself is low. 
 
There are many impediments to a court’s ability to create an 
accurate historical record. For one thing, the need to establish a 
historical record is sometimes at odds with the primary purpose 
of the trial, which is to determine whether the accused is 
 
of such courts). 
 96. See id. at 303. See also supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text. 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30 (noting that trials at 
international criminal courts often involve hundreds of witnesses and 
thousands of exhibits). 
 99. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 66(3). 
 100. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 744 (“The limits of evidential and 
procedural rules confer legitimacy and credibility to the outcome. An 
independent court establishes facts through a public trial where each element 
needs to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 101. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 64(10). 
 102. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1973 (noting that many “tribunal affiliates” 
claimed that international trials could “establish a truthful public record of past 
injustices”); Turner, supra note 13, at 539 (noting that prominent academics 
and judges have argued that the establishment of a historical record is one of 
the most important contributions of international trials). 
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guilty.103 Straying too far from this central question could 
undermine the accused’s right to a fair trial.104 For example, a 
prosecutor that tries to introduce evidence that helps establish 
the historical record but is not necessary to support the charges 
is likely to face a challenge that the evidence is irrelevant or 
prejudicial.105 Thus due process considerations limit the court’s 
ability to create an accurate historical record.106 
In addition, courts are not an ideal mechanism for creating 
a historical record. Judges are not trained historians, nor are the 
other court personnel.107 Moreover, the adversarial process is not 
necessarily conducive to ascertaining historical truth.108 Thus, 
even if they wished to create an accurate historical record, courts 
are not well suited for that task.109 
The historical record can also be undermined by the use of 
plea bargains. In many cases, plea deals involve the dropping of 
many of the charges, which results in the record being silent 
with regard to those charges.110 But even for charges that result 
 
 103. Damaška, supra note 1, at 336 (noting that courts are required to focus 
on legally relevant information and must thus sometimes forego exploring 
matters that would be “important to a full historical account”); See Turner, 
supra note 13, at 534; 
 104. Damaška, supra note 1, at 334. See Turner, supra note 13, at 540-41. 
 105. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 743 (noting that “all evidence has to be 
related to the relevant charges against the individual defendant” and that this 
may prevent evidence about the context or background of the crimes from being 
admitted). See also Turner, supra note 13, at 571–72 (noting that prosecutors 
often attempt to introduce evidence that may provide a more complete historical 
record but that is not necessary to support the charges and that defense 
attorneys strenuously object to the introduction of such evidence). But see 
Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 743 (noting that some international crimes contain 
elements which require the prosecution to prove background information like 
the existence of an armed conflict or an attack upon the civilian population). 
 106. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 64(2) (imposing on the Trial 
Chamber an obligation to ensure that the trial is “fair and expeditious and is 
conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused”); See also id. art. 67 
(describing the rights of the accused). 
 107. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 742. 
 108. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 337–38. 
 109. Id. at 336 (noting that the requirements of a trial require an immediate 
decision which cannot be modified or improved later if further evidence comes 
to light, which makes courts ill-suited to the creation of a historical record). See 
also id. at 340–41 (noting that the ICTY’s attempt to use the Milošević trial to 
“produce a record of events accompanying the disintegration of Yugoslavia” 
overwhelmed the court). 
 110. See Clark, supra note 60, at 427–28 (noting that charge bargaining, 
where charges are dropped in return for a guilty plea, has the undesirable effect 
of preventing evidence about those charges from being included in the record); 
Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 753 (same). 
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in convictions, plea deals usually result in a sparse factual 
record.111 Thus, the use of plea bargains will usually lower the 
likelihood of creating an accurate historical record.112 
Another problem is that the record created by international 
criminal trials is almost always incomplete. International 
tribunals cannot prosecute every wrong that occurred in a given 
situation.113 Prosecutors try to choose cases so that they are 
representative of the overall criminality that occurred, but it is 
almost always just a subset of that criminality.114 The record 
may also be limited by temporal, geographic, or other limitations 
on the court’s jurisdiction.115 As a result, even in the best case, 
the record created by such courts is partial.116 
A number of academics have tried to evaluate the likelihood 
of courts establishing an accurate historical record. Their 
conclusions suggest that establishing an accurate (although 
partial) record is difficult but can in certain circumstances be 
achieved. For example, Professor Damaška argues that the 
ability of courts to create an accurate historical record is “rather 
modest” and that the “best that can be expected of them is to 
provide fragmentary material as a scaffolding for subsequent 
historical research.”117 Professor Rauxloh acknowledges that the 
history created by courts is necessarily incomplete but argues 
that the experience of the International Military Tribunal at 
 
 111. See Clark, supra note 60, at 426–27 (noting that the record produced as 
a result of a guilty plea is less complete and detailed than would be established 
during a trial); Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 752 (same); Turner, supra note 13, at 
540 (noting the reluctance of some judges to accept plea bargains because they 
“only establish the bare factual allegations”). 
 112. But see Clark, supra note 60, at 424 (noting that in some cases guilty 
pleas have provided evidence about events that were otherwise unknown and 
thus did contribute to the establishment of the historical record). 
 113. See Michael Humphrey, International Intervention, justice and national 
reconciliation: the role of the ICTY and ICTR in Bosnia and Rwanda, 2 J. 
HUMAN RTS. 495, 498–99 (2003) (“The sheer number of offences makes the 
prosecution of every offence impossible.”). 
 114. See Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26, at 64 (noting that 
international courts have tended to use a philosophy of representative charging 
where “the goal is to charge the accused with a representative selection of 
crimes that accurately conveys the scope of the accused’s criminality”); Stuart 
Ford, The Complexity of International Criminal Trials is Necessary, 48 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 151, 192–93 (2015) (describing representative charging). 
 115. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 742–43. 
 116. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1973; Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 743 
(noting that “only a small minority of crimes committed in a conflict will be 
brought to justice and made part of the historic record of the court”). 
 117. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 338. 
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Nuremberg shows that international courts can sometimes 
establish an accurate historical record.118 My own research 
indicates that the ICTY may have begun the process of 
establishing a widely-accepted account of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia.119 
Ultimately, it appears that it is only moderately likely that 
courts can effectively create an accurate historical record. On the 
one hand, trials create a record of the events necessary to prove 
the criminal responsibility of the accused. On the other hand, 
court personnel are not historians, due process limitations 
prevent the court from straying too far from the facts necessary 
to establish the accused’s guilt, and the use of representative 
charging undercuts the record-setting function. 
The second component of the expected value calculation is 
estimating the value of creating an accurate historical record 
(assuming it can be achieved). The value of a historical record is 
low because its main value appears to be a means to achieve 
some other goal. For example, I have argued that establishing a 
historical record can play a role in fostering post-conflict 
reconciliation.120 Others who have written about this subject 
have made similar arguments.121 To the extent that establishing 
a record is pursued as a mechanism to achieve some other goal, 
however, the expected benefits that stem from achieving that 
other goal cannot be attributed to the record. The expected value 
of the record-setting function is the value of that function as an 
end in itself. 
Having an accurate historical record undoubtedly has some 
intrinsic value,122 but it is striking that most of the arguments 
about the record-setting function focus on it as a mechanism for 
achieving some other goal. It is rarely called for as an end in 
 
 118. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 744. See also Ford, supra note 63, at 
468–70 (noting the success of the IMT). 
 119. See Ford, supra note 63, at 470–71. 
 120. Id. at 463–75. 
 121. See Damaška, supra note 56, at 335 (arguing that “truth telling about 
the past is a necessary precondition for reconciliation and avoidance of future 
conflicts”); Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 740 (arguing that establishing the 
historical record is an important component of post-conflict reconciliation 
because “[o]nly when the truth is established can reconciliation begin”); Turner, 
supra note 13, at 540 (noting that the establishment of a historical record has 
been promoted as a means to maintain peace after conflict and prevent future 
violations). 
 122. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1973 (noting an accurate historical record 
would preserve important facts that might “otherwise be lost through an 
intentional purge or the inevitable amnesia of time”). 
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itself. This strongly suggests that the intrinsic benefit that flows 
from achieving it is low. 
C. PROVIDING CLOSURE OR REDRESS FOR VICTIMS 
It is sometimes argued that international trials can provide 
either closure or redress for victims of serious crimes.123 This can 
occur in several ways. One way is through the process of a public 
trial and verdict. This process may provide closure for victims 
and their communities by formally and publicly acknowledging 
the harm they have suffered.124 If the defendant pleads guilty 
and provides a meaningful and sincere acknowledgement of 
fault, this may also provide closure for some victims.125 In 
theory, the trial can also result in some form of restitution or 
reparations for victims.126 
Another way that trials may provide closure for victims is 
by providing opportunities to testify. Permitting people to tell 
their story can be therapeutic for some witnesses.127 More 
recently, the ICC has permitted victims to take on roles beyond 
that of witness.128 For example, victims can make 
 
 123. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 333–34 (noting that providing victims 
and their families “a forum in which to express their suffering” is a useful goal); 
deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312 (“[P]rosecutions may well help to restore some 
victims, offenders, and communities under some circumstances.”); Turner, 
supra note 13, at 542 (noting that international trials are “said to serve 
survivors of the crimes by helping them and their communities achieve a sense 
of closure”). 
 124. See Humphrey, supra note 113, at 500 (“Society is ‘healed’ through the 
prosecution and punishment of the perpetrator . . . .”); Charles P. Trumbull IV, 
The Victims of Participation in International Criminal Proceedings, 29 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 777, 802–03 (2008). 
 125. See Clark, supra note 60, at 428–29. But see id. at 429–31 (noting that 
guilty pleas are often accompanied by sentence reductions and that such 
reductions can anger victims who may feel that the accused has not been 
sufficiently punished). 
 126. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 75(1) (“The Court shall 
establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”). 
 127. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1970–71 (arguing that individual victims 
can benefit from having a “safe forum to have their stories formally heard and 
acknowledged”); Trumbull, supra note 124, at 802 (noting that advocates claim 
that the “simple act of testifying . . . can be therapeutic.”); Turner, supra note 
13, at 542 (noting that trials can provide closure by “providing a forum for 
victims to tell their stories and have the wrongs done to them formally 
acknowledged”). 
 128. See generally Marian Pena, Victim Participation at the International 
Criminal Court: Achievements Made and Challenges Ahead, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & 
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“representations” to the court when the Prosecutor seeks to open 
an investigation,129 and victims can have their “views and 
concerns” formally considered by the court during the trial.130 
These innovations provide further opportunities for victims to 
participate in the process in ways that may provide closure for 
them.131 
Thus, it appears possible that international criminal trials 
can provide redress or closure for victims. The expected value of 
this goal, however, is likely to be low for two reasons. First, 
providing closure or redress is difficult and achieving this goal is 
unlikely for any particular victim. Second, even when it is 
achieved, the actions of states suggest that it has a low value. 
To begin with, while participation in the trial as either a 
witness or party may provide some benefits, this is not the 
typical outcome for victims of serious international crimes. The 
biggest obstacle to participation is that international courts 
rarely try every possible crime.132 This means that the charged 
crimes are likely to cover the victimization of only a small 
fraction of the total number of victims. The vast majority of 
victims will have no part to play because the crimes that affected 
them are not part of the trial.133 
Even if the particular crime that victimized them is part of 
the prosecution, there is still no guarantee that victims will 
receive either closure or redress. First, victims’ avenues for 
participation are limited. The average investigation at the ICC 
involves allegations of more than a thousand murders, hundreds 
to thousands of rapes, thousands of serious injuries, and 
hundreds of thousands of instances of forcible displacement.134 
 
COMP. L. 497 (2010); Christine Van den Wyngaert, Victims Before International 
Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge, 44 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 475, 490–91 (2011). 
 129. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 15(3). 
 130. See id. art. 68(3) (“Where the personal interests of the victims are 
affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and 
considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the 
Court . . . .”). 
 131. See Pena, supra note 128, at 500–01. 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 113–114. 
 133. See Humphrey, supra note 113, at 499 (“The practical problems of time, 
expense and the volume of evidence required to prosecute all offences means 
that neither all perpetrators can be prosecuted nor all victims compensated.”); 
Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 491–92 (noting that “[v]ictims of 
uncharged crimes in situations that are before the court will not be able to 
participate”). 
 134. See Ford, supra, note 4, at Section III(B). See also Trumbull, supra note 
2018] GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 203 
Yet, evidence about large-scale victimization is usually 
presented through a small number of victim-witnesses 
supplemented by the testimony of forensic and demographic 
experts.135 The Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC anticipates 
that it will present only fifty to sixty witnesses during a typical 
case.136 As a result, the vast majority of victims will not be able 
to participate as witnesses, even if the particular crime that 
victimized them is prosecuted. 
Moreover, while there is some evidence that testifying can 
be therapeutic for some victims,137 this is not a given. First of all, 
the trial is not designed as a means to provide closure for 
witnesses.138 While judges try to protect witnesses,139 they also 
are bound to provide due process to the accused.140 This often 
means that witnesses are subjected to aggressive cross-
examinations by defense counsel.141 There is the possibility that 
this experience will re-traumatize the witnesses rather than 
help them heal.142 Testifying may also subject victims to other 
 
124, at 811 (“Crimes falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction may involve hundreds 
of thousands of victims . . . .”). 
 135. See Ford, The Complexity of International Criminal Trials is Necessary, 
supra note 114, at 165 (noting that while the testimony of victims is used in 
international trials, not every victim will testify and in cases where there are 
large numbers of victims, much of the evidence related to the victims is provided 
in summary form by forensic and demographic experts). 
 136. See Ford, supra note 4. 
 137. See Turner, supra note 13, at 542 (noting that the ICTY claimed that 
its witnesses found that the opportunity to testify “brought them great relief”); 
Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 477 (arguing that “many courageous 
victims” were “very keen to come to come and testify and tell their stories”). 
 138. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1972 (noting that the tribunals’ procedures 
are designed to “suit the requirements of legal proof” rather than ensuring the 
witness’ psychological well-being). 
 139. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 68(1) (“The Court shall take 
appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-
being, dignity, and privacy of victims and witnesses.”). See also Andrew Trotter, 
Witness Intimidation in International Trials: Balancing the Need for Protection 
Against the Rights of the Accused, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 531–36 
(describing witness protection measures employed by international courts). 
 140. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 68(1) (noting that victim and 
witness protection measures “shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”). 
 141. See Humphrey, supra note 113, at 499 (arguing that the trials represent 
a “legal re-enactment of violence” and that participation by victims essentially 
asks them to “re-victimize themselves” by re-enacting their trauma); Turner, 
supra note 13, at 568–69 (noting that defense attorneys at international trials 
feel an obligation to engage in aggressive cross-examination of witnesses, even 
if this might re-traumatize the witness). 
 142. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 342 (noting that the need to permit 
204 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1 
risks and several victim-witnesses have been intimidated, 
threatened, or killed because of their testimony.143 Taken 
together, it seems quite unlikely that any particular victim will 
achieve closure by testifying at an international trial. 
Unlike most of its predecessors, the ICC provides 
opportunities for victims to participate as more than just 
witnesses.144 This means that more victims can participate than 
would otherwise be able to do so if victims were limited to being 
witnesses. This participation has limits, however. For one thing, 
victim participation cannot conflict with the accused’s right to a 
fair trial.145 This tension between the rights of the accused and 
victim participation limits the extent to which victims can 
meaningfully participate in the process.146 
The sheer number of victims in international trials also 
limits their ability to meaningfully participate.147 At the ICC, 
the large number of victims means that they have been grouped 
together in victims’ groups, which limits the ability of individual 
victims to meaningfully participate.148 Moreover, the victims’ 
 
vigorous cross-examination is necessary for a fair trial but runs the risk of 
traumatizing victims who testify); Turner, supra note 13, at 542 (noting 
concerns that testifying can re-traumatize some victims). But see Van den 
Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 477 (arguing that, in practice, cross-examination 
of victims “although difficult at times” was “controlled by presiding judges” to 
protect victims). 
 143. See Trotter, supra note 139, at 522–25 (describing numerous incidents 
of witness intimidation at international courts). See also Levitt, supra note 57, 
at 1972 (noting that testifying has sometimes threatened the physical safety of 
witnesses). 
 144. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 68(3). 
 145. See id. (noting that victim participation shall not be “prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”). 
 146. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 342 (noting that permitting victims to 
take on larger responsibilities beyond just offering testimony, for example by 
allowing them to make legal arguments or question witnesses, could undermine 
parts of the trial); deGuzman, supra note 47, at 311–12 (noting that “allowing 
victims to participate in the determination of guilt” may violate the defendants’ 
rights to a fair trial); Pena, supra note 128, at 510 (noting defense concerns that 
victims participation could undermine the right to a fair trial); Turner, supra 
note 13, at 542–43 (noting that victim participation in trials, particularly when 
it is extensive, may violate the rights of the accused to a fair and speedy trial); 
Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 488 (noting the difficulty of balancing the 
accused’s rights against the rights of victims). 
 147. See Trumbull, supra note 124, at 806–07 (noting that the large numbers 
of potential victims undermines many of the potential benefits of participation). 
 148. See Pena, supra note 128, at 514 (noting that, in practice, “one lawyer 
normally represents a group of participating victims”); Van den Wyngaert, 
supra note 128, at 483 (noting that the number of victims who have requested 
participation combined with the time-consuming nature of dealing with those 
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“views” are presented through “legal representatives” rather 
than by the victims themselves.149 This placement of a legal 
representative between the victims and the court limits the 
ability of victims to achieve closure.150 Even with these 
limitations, victim participation consumes a great deal of the 
ICC’s time and slows down the trials.151 It seems unlikely that 
more meaningful participation for victims is feasible. There are 
thus reasons to doubt that victims, even when they are 
permitted to participate as parties, are likely to achieve closure 
as a result of that participation. 
Reparations are also not likely to be available to victims. 
First of all, most victims will not be entitled to reparations 
because their victimization is not part of the charged crimes.152 
Even assuming that a victim is eligible to participate in the trial, 
reparations are very unlikely. While reparations for individual 
victims are theoretically possible,153 in practice, courts simply do 
not have the resources to provide reparations themselves and 
 
requests means that the court may be compelled to require victims to 
participate in groups rather than individually). 
 149. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 68(3); Pena, supra note 128, at 
514 (noting that while “the Statute does not demand that victims act through a 
lawyer, that is unavoidable in practice”); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 
480 (noting that “it is theoretically possible for victims to appear individually” 
but that this is “totally impractical” due to the large number of victims and that 
victims are “in all cases” represented by lawyers). 
 150. See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 489 (“Victims who expect to 
find a forum where they could personally and publicly express their grief and 
thus have a platform to expose their feelings will probably be disappointed. In 
mass trials, victims are necessarily represented by common legal 
representatives, and consequently victims will not be able to appear in 
person.”). See also Pena, supra note 128, at 515 (noting that lack of funding and 
resources for legal representatives have undermined the ability of victims to 
meaningfully participate); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 489 (noting 
that the large numbers of victims together under common legal representatives 
combined with the large distances between the court and the victims may make 
it difficult for them to feel any meaningful sense of control over their own 
participation). 
 151. Pena, supra note 128, at 509 (noting fears that “large numbers of 
victims applying to participate could destabilize the proceedings”); Trumbull, 
supra note 124, at 811–16; Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 481–83 
(noting that the judges must rule individually on many aspects of victim 
participation and that this “inevitably delays” the proceedings). It is also a very 
slow and cumbersome process for the victims themselves. See Pena, supra note 
128, at 511–12 (noting that some victims have had to wait two years for the 
court to rule on their applications to become participants). 
 152. See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 492 (“Only victims of crimes 
charged that lead to a conviction will be able to claim reparations.”). See also 
supra text accompanying notes 132–133. 
 153. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
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the accused are usually indigent.154 The reality is that 
reparations are likely to be purely symbolic.155 In addition, 
courts may not be capable of adjudicating claims for reparations 
from large numbers of victims, even if resources were 
available.156 Thus, there is little likelihood that victims will 
receive reparations. 
For various reasons, it seems unlikely that most victims of 
serious international crimes can experience closure or receive 
redress as a result of international trials. The biggest obstacle to 
achieving closure is the selective nature of charging at 
international trials. Most victims will not be able to participate 
in the process at all simply because the crime that victimized 
them will not be part of the trial. They cannot be witnesses, they 
cannot participate as victims, they cannot receive reparations, 
and the verdict will not address their suffering. 
The next step in assigning an expected value to this goal is 
to assess the value of achieving the goal. The Rome Statute 
provides for a Trust Fund for Victims.157 The purpose of the 
Trust Fund is to collect money “for the benefit of victims” and 
their families.158 Contributions to the Trust Fund are 
voluntary159 and states contribute slightly less than $6 million 
per year.160 It seems reasonable to treat this as the value that 
 
 154. See infra Section VI. 
 155. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 491 (“Reparations for victims 
risks being more symbolic than real.”). 
 156. Id. at 487 (“Imagine for a moment what might happen if, after the 
criminal trial has been completed, the Trial Chamber would still have to rule 
on each individual claim for reparations. If the extent of the harm suffered and 
the causal link with the crimes has to be proved on an individual basis, there is 
a good chance that the length of the reparations proceedings could exceed the 
duration of the criminal trial itself.”). 
 157. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 79(1). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See The Trust Fund for Victims, Strategic Plan 2014-2017 – Summary, 
at 2 (2014), http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/media_
library/documents/pdf/TFV%20Brochure%20ASP%202014%20FINAL.pdf 
(noting that the Trust Fund uses “voluntary contributions from donors” to 
provide “assistance to victims and their families in ICC situations through 
programmes of physical rehabilitation, material support, and psychological 
rehabilitation”). 
 160. After a slow start, the Trust Fund is now receiving approximately €5 
million per year in donations. See Trust Fund for Victims, Programme Progress 
Report 2015: Assistance & Reparations at 56 (2015), http://www.trustfundfor
victims.org/sites/default/files/media_library/documents/FinalTFVPPR2015.pdf 
(showing total donations over time). This corresponds to less than $6 million 
per year at current exchange rates. On March 11, 2016, the exchange rate was 
1.1180 dollar to the euro. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
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states assign to providing redress for victims because this is how 
much they are willing to voluntarily spend on this goal.161 Thus, 
the actions of states strongly suggest that they assign a low 
value to providing closure and redress for victims of serious 
international crimes.162 Ultimately, achieving closure is unlikely 
and provides a low value even when it is achieved. 
D. EXPRESSING CONDEMNATION 
International criminal courts are often urged to use their 
trials and the resulting verdicts to express condemnation of 
morally abhorrent conduct.163 Some scholars frame this goal as 
one of educating the public about the court, the law, and the 
atrocities that have been committed.164 Despite this slight 
difference in framing, these are very similar goals and will be 
treated together in this Article. The idea is that through their 
trials and verdicts, courts can express condemnation for acts 
that are universally recognized as unconscionable.165 
International criminal courts are alleged to be in a good position 
to express this condemnation because their high profile gives 
them a global audience.166 Thus, their trials promote global 
norms of conduct, even though those trials are small in 
number.167 Many scholars argue that this educative or 
 
Foreign Exchange Rates, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat
00_eu.htm. 
 161. The ICC also spends about $10 million per year on victim-related tasks. 
See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 480. But the majority of this is spent 
on salaries of personnel. Very little of it actually goes to victims. 
 162. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312 (suggesting that providing redress 
for victims can serve as only a partial justification for international courts). 
 163. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (describing the “didactic objective of 
improving respect for human rights by expressing outrage for their violation”); 
deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312–19 (arguing that the ICC should use its 
prosecutions to express condemnation of wrongdoing). 
 164. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (arguing that the goals of international 
tribunals include “public education in general” as well as “illuminat[ing] 
explanations about what caused the violations and illustrat[ing] particular 
patterns of conduct”). 
 165. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 316 (arguing that the extreme gravity 
of international crimes makes them worthy of expressive condemnation by 
international courts). 
 166. Id. (arguing that the ICC’s global scope makes it a good platform for 
expressing condemnation of serious violations and the expression of shared 
norms). 
 167. Id. at 315 (suggesting that international courts can “effectively promote 
important moral norms” through illustrative prosecutions even if the total 
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expressive function of trials is one of their most important 
features.168 
Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that 
expressing condemnation is not an end in itself, but a 
mechanism to achieve a different goal. Expressing 
condemnation of unconscionable conduct probably has some 
intrinsic value, but that intrinsic value is not very large. As 
noted above, states do not assign a high value to retribution as 
an end in itself.169 If they do not place great value on actually 
punishing wrongful conduct, it does not seem very likely that 
they simultaneously attach great value to simply expressing 
condemnation of wrongful conduct. And, indeed, most of those 
who have written about the expressive function of courts 
acknowledge that its primary value is as a mechanism to achieve 
a different goal—prevention. 
Professor deGuzman argues that the trials and verdicts can 
be used by courts as a means of altering social norms about 
acceptable conduct.170 She claims that this will eventually lead 
to the prevention of future crimes as the norm comes to be more 
widely accepted.171 Justin Levitt echoes this argument and 
claims that tribunals engage in “moral education” about the 
norms of international law primarily as a means of “long-term 
prevention” of violations.172 Professor Damaška makes a similar 
argument.173 Payam Akhavan talks about how “[p]ublicly 
vindicating human rights norms . . . may help to prevent future 
atrocities through the power of moral example to transform 
behavior.”174 As these examples show, expressing condemnation 
is primarily a mechanism for the prevention of international 
crimes rather than an end in itself. This means that the value of 
succeeding in preventing violations by utilizing this mechanism 
 
number of prosecutions is low). 
 168. See id. at 270 (arguing that “the ICC’s focus should be on expressing 
global norms”); id. at 301 (arguing that “the ICC’s primary objective in making 
selection decision should be to express global norms”); Schrag, supra note 1, at 
428–29 (arguing that the “didactic function” should be among the most 
important goals of international tribunals). 
 169. See supra Section III. 
 170. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 313. 
 171. Id. (“Norm expression through criminal law can function as a form of 
prevention – discouraging crime by entrenching values . . . .”). 
 172. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1966. 
 173. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 345 (arguing that tribunals should seek 
to persuade people to comply with international criminal law by stigmatizing 
violations). 
 174. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 10. See also id. at 12–13. 
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accrues to the prevention goal. The intrinsic value of achieving 
this goal is low. 
For purposes of calculating an expected value of expressing 
condemnation, it is also necessary to estimate how often the goal 
can be accomplished. While there is little empirical evidence on 
this point, it seems reasonable to assume that the verdicts are 
reasonably successful in expressing condemnation of abhorrent 
conduct. After all, the trials are often high-profile events that 
attract considerable press coverage.175 The verdicts, moreover, 
provide extensive documentation of wrongdoing which has been 
tested through an adversarial process.176 And by their very 
nature guilty verdicts and sentences convey condemnation.177 
Thus it seems reasonable to assume that courts are moderately 
likely to achieve this goal. 
E. DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Another goal attributed to international tribunals is to 
develop international criminal law.178 When the ad hoc tribunals 
were created in the early 1990s, there were many gaps in the 
law that would apply.179 The courts quickly set about trying to 
fill those gaps by developing new law.180 The most famous 
example of this was the ICTY’s embrace of joint criminal 
enterprise. In the Tadić decision, the newly-created ICTY 
created a theory of liability that permitted it to find the 
defendant guilty for participating with others in a common plan 
 
 175. See supra text accompanying note 166. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 98–102. 
 177. See Stuart Ford, The Complexity of International Criminal Trials is 
Necessary, supra note 114, at 185–86 (noting that one of the purposes of 
convicting someone of a crime is to publicly condemn that person as a wrongdoer 
and punish them). 
 178. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that one purpose attributed to 
international tribunals is to “develop and expand the application and 
interpretation of international law and norms”). 
 179. See Leena Grover, A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting 
the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 543, 547 (2010) (noting that at the time the ICTY and 
ICTR statutes were created, there were many gaps in both the substantive and 
procedural law that had to be filled by the courts themselves). 
 180. See Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the 
International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VANDERBILT L. 
REV. 1, 25–33 (2006) (noting that the ICTY’s early decisions adopted an 
expansive understanding of international criminal law). 
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to achieve a criminal outcome.181 While the court claimed that 
joint criminal enterprise liability already existed in 
international law,182 this position has generally been rejected.183 
Instead, the court essentially created a new mode of liability.184 
Joint criminal enterprise went on to become a widely-used 
theory of liability at the ICTY.185 In this sense, the ICTY was 
successful in developing new international criminal law.186 Nor 
is it the only example of an international court developing new 
law.187 Indeed, it can probably be said that courts have been 
fairly successful at it.188 Thus, it is moderately likely that courts 
can achieve this goal, but the reactions of states suggest that this 
is a goal they accord little value. 
To begin with, there are doubts about whether it is wise for 
courts to be in the business of developing new law.189 For 
example, the theory of joint criminal enterprise has been 
 
 181. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of 
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 104–10 (2005) (describing the 
development of joint criminal enterprise at the ICTY). 
 182. Id. at 105 (noting that the Appeals Chamber argued that it was simply 
applying existing customary international law). 
 183. Id. at 110–12 (arguing that the WWII-era cases that the ICTY allegedly 
relied upon do not provide support for the extremely broad doctrine the ICTY 
adopted). 
 184. Id. at 103–04 (concluding that joint criminal enterprise “has largely 
been created by the judges and prosecutors of the Yugoslav Tribunal”). 
 185. Id. at 107–08. 
 186. On the other hand, other courts, most notably the ICTR, did not broadly 
adopt joint criminal enterprise. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 181, at 
n.135 (noting that joint criminal enterprise was rarely used at the ICTR). 
 187. Id. at 133–34 (noting that the ICTR and ICTY developed international 
law through their decisions by expanding the definitions of rape and torture). 
 188. See Grover, supra note 179, at 547 (noting that the ad hoc tribunals 
“put flesh on the bones of modern international criminal law”). 
 189. See Beth van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the 
Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119 (2008) (noting that it may be 
quite dangerous to allow international courts free rein to develop international 
criminal law and that courts that do engage in such development have tended 
not to respect the principle of nullum crimen sine lege); Danner & Martinez, 
supra note 181, at 142–43 (noting that when presented with opportunities to 
develop substantive international law, “international judges have almost 
invariably elected the most expansive interpretation” permitted and have “not 
seriously grappled with the question of how to define limits” on their new 
doctrines); Danner, supra note 180, at 44–49 (noting arguments both for and 
against tribunal lawmaking); Schrag, supra note 1, at 431 (suggesting that the 
desire to develop international criminal law is sometimes at odds with the 
necessity to prove guilt in particular cases and that placing too much emphasis 
on legal theory can be counter-productive). 
2018] GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 211 
severely criticized by scholars as both unsupported by the 
existing precedent and unfair to defendants.190 More 
importantly, however, states assign a low value to having courts 
develop new international law. This can be seen most clearly at 
the ICC. First, unlike the somewhat loose constitutive 
documents of the ad hoc tribunals, the Rome Statute is very 
detailed.191 This was done because states wanted to “list crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction exhaustively and in as detailed 
and clear manner as possible so that states and their agents 
could know with reasonable certainty” their obligations under 
the Statute.192 Permitting judges to develop new international 
law would be at odds with the drafters’ desire to know with 
certainty what is prohibited. 
Moreover, the Rome Statute contains an explicit provision 
that limits the ability of the court to develop new international 
law. Article 22(2) states that “[t]he definition of a crime shall be 
strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.”193 This 
provision was inserted to make it difficult for the ICC to create 
new law through judicial decisions and to rein in the perceived 
excesses of the ad hoc tribunals.194 States wanted to make sure 
 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 180–184 (noting that joint criminal 
enterprise was largely a creation of the ICTY); Danner & Martinez, supra note 
181, at 134–36 (arguing that the creation of joint criminal enterprise by the 
ICTY was problematic because it attenuates the connection between an 
individual’s culpability for their own actions and their guilt); Antonio Cassese, 
The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 114–23 (2007) (describing 
criticisms of joint criminal enterprise); Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Liability: 
Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 606 (2004) (criticizing the use of joint criminal enterprise as 
a mode of liability at the ICTY). 
 191. See Bruce Broomball, Article 22: Nullum crimen sine lege, in OTTO 
TRIFFTERER ED., COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (2d ed. 2008) at 714 (noting that the Rome Statute was the 
result of “a move towards the vision . . . of a Court the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of which is exhaustively defined in its constitutive instrument”); 
Grover, supra note 179, at 552–53 (noting that the Rome Statute contains vastly 
more detail about the crimes and the procedure than the statutes of the ICTY 
and ICTR). 
 192. See id. at 552. See also Broomhall, supra note 191, at 714. 
 193. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 22(2). 
 194. See Grover, supra note 179, at 553 (noting that “[t]he perceived liberal 
interpretive reasoning of the ad hoc tribunals was a motivating factor” in the 
adoption of Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute); Broomhall, supra note 191, at 
725 (“[I]t was the apparently perceived willingness of the ICTY to engage in 
liberal reasoning-by-analogy that contributed, in part, to the adoption of article 
22 para. 2.”). 
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that if new international law was to be developed that they 
would have control over the process through amendments to the 
Rome Statute.195 
The Rome Statute’s strict approach to the principle of 
legality shows that the states responsible for creating the ICC 
did not want its judges to develop new international law. This 
strongly suggests that states believe the value of having courts 
develop new international law is low. Thus, while courts have 
been moderately successful in developing new international law 
in the past, the value of achieving this goal is low. 
F. FOSTERING POST-CONFLICT RECONCILIATION 
It is often argued that the work of international criminal 
courts can foster post-conflict reconciliation.196 There are a 
number of theories about how this might work. According to one 
theory, ethnic, religious, and national divisions are at the heart 
of many modern conflicts.197 These conflicts leave the opposing 
sides deeply suspicious and hostile towards the other side.198 It 
is common for each side to view themselves as victims of 
unwarranted aggression by the other side.199 These feelings of 
victimization and grievance make it harder to achieve a durable 
peace and make it more likely that there will be more violence 
in the future.200 By establishing a credible record of what 
actually took place, courts can help break down inaccurate 
narratives about the conflict.201 In turn, this can help the parties 
 
 195. See id. at 724 (“The rule of strict construction aims to protect the person 
subject to investigation or prosecution by ensuring that the potential 
infringement of their liberty is subject only to legislatively and not to judicially 
defined crimes . . . .”); id. at 716 (noting that Article 22 embodies the premise 
that “the law-maker is responsible for making the law clear and ascertainable, 
while the judiciary is obliged to refrain in principle from penalizing conduct not 
made criminal by the legislator”); Grover, supra note 179, at 554 (noting that 
the Rome Statute adopts a strict approach to the principle of legality so as to 
limit the ability of judges to create new law while simultaneously “ensur[ing] 
respect for the law-making role of the legislature”). 
 196. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 311, Ford, supra note 63, at 463–75 
(arguing that international criminal courts can foster post-conflict 
reconciliation); Levitt, supra note 57, at 1970–71. 
 197. Ford, supra note 63, at 459. 
 198. Id. at 460–61. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 465–66. 
 201. Id. at 466–71. 
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reconcile and reduce the risk of further violations.202 There are 
other ways courts might be able to foster post-conflict 
reconciliation. For example, courts may be able to decrease the 
likelihood of future violations by providing an alternative to 
revenge as a means for resolving grievances.203 
Achieving post-conflict reconciliation is far from certain, 
however. One problem is that inaccurate internal narratives 
about the conflict are difficult to break down.204 Another problem 
is that breaking down self-serving narratives may be a 
prerequisite for reconciliation but it does not guarantee it. 
Successful reconciliation still depends on the concerted efforts of 
many other actors in society.205 Nevertheless, it may be possible 
for courts to promote reconciliation, even if the process is slow.206 
Ultimately, it seems only moderately likely that courts can 
successfully foster post-conflict reconciliation in any particular 
conflict. 
Having discussed the likelihood that this goal can be 
achieved, the next step is trying to put a value on achieving it. It 
is important to note, however, that this “goal” is usually framed 
as a mechanism to either restore peace or prevent future 
violations.207 Rarely is it framed as an end in itself. 
Nevertheless, helping post-conflict societies reconcile does have 
intrinsic value. There is evidence that helping societies to 
 
 202. Id. at 471. 
 203. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 24–25 (“Channeling the desire for 
vengeance into legal process, even with the imprisonment of thousands, bought 
time until circumstances improved and mitigated the severity of retaliatory 
abuses.”); Levitt, supra note 57, at 1970–71 (“Alternatively prosecutions may 
serve as vehicles for public catharsis . . . and a society may need a sustained 
and ritualized event to channel the grieving process.”); Turner, supra note 13, 
at 537 (arguing that international trials can help to end violence by offering an 
alternative to revenge as a means of providing retribution for past wrongs). 
 204. See Ford, supra note 63, at 466–68 (noting the difficulty of breaking 
down self-serving narratives about conflict). See also Levitt, supra note 57, at 
1971 (“[T]he tribunals’ adversarial processes may also deepen local divides. 
Their client communities . . . may see tribunal activities through the polarized 
lenses of their ethnic groups . . . .”). 
 205. See Ford, supra note 63, at 476 (suggesting other actors throughout 
society can help alter internal narratives). 
 206. Id. at 468–71 (arguing that the IMT contributed to changes in German 
attitudes towards WWII). 
 207. See supra text accompanying notes 202–203. See also Clark, supra note 
60, at 420 (noting that reconciliation was viewed by the ICTY as a means to 
maintain peace in the former Yugoslavia); id. at 421; deGuzman, supra note 47, 
at 311 (“[R]estorative justice is about prevention of future crimes.”); id. at 311 
(noting that post-conflict reconciliation is often a mechanism to enhance long-
term peace and security). 
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reconcile alleviates some of the trauma associated with the 
violence of the past and improves the psychological health of 
those who can forgive.208 Of course, the evidence also suggests 
that how reconciliation occurs is also important and that some 
mechanisms for achieving reconciliation may cause harm.209 
Nevertheless, successful reconciliation within society is likely to 
be associated with improved psychological health, which has 
value. 
Placing a value on this improvement is difficult, however. 
One way to think about its value is to compare it with the value 
of closure for victims. Fostering post-conflict reconciliation 
seems conceptually similar to the goal of providing closure that 
is discussed above.210 The major difference is that post-conflict 
reconciliation covers the entire society, rather than just the 
victims, and thus potentially has a broader reach. Nevertheless, 
the goal of reconciling members of society appears to be quite 
similar to the goal of providing closure to victims in that it seeks 
to use a judicial process to help people come to terms with what 
happened during the conflict. 
The discussion above in Section V.C. argued that closure as 
a goal has a relatively low value. When viewed as a goal in itself, 
rather than as a mechanism to achieve prevention, it seems 
likely that fostering post-conflict reconciliation has a similar 
value. Thus, like closure, post-conflict reconciliation will be 
assigned a low value. Accordingly, this goal is moderately likely 
for courts to achieve and when it is achieved has a low value. 
 
 
 208. See Jacobus Cilliers et al., Reconciling After Civil Conflict Increases 
Social Capital but Decreases Individual Well-Being, 352 SCIENCE 787, 787–88 
(2016). 
 209. Id. at 787–88 (noting that while reconciliation achieved through long-
term counseling appears to generally improve psychological health, 
reconciliation that occurs as a result of targeted reconciliation efforts may 
actually lower psychological health); id. at 791 (noting that individuals who 
went through a targeted reconciliation process actually had worse psychological 
health after the process). 
 210. For example, a number of scholars have treated victim participation in 
the trials as an aspect of post-conflict reconciliation. See Pena, supra note 128, 
at 501 (“[H]aving victims to participate in the trials allows them to experience 
justice and can lay the foundation for reconciliation in the communities.”); 
Trumbull, supra note 124, at 778 (“[P]articipation will . . . contribute to the 
reconciliation process . . . .”). 
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G. ENDING IMPUNITY 
Another goal often attributed to international tribunals is to 
end impunity.211 This goal appears explicitly in the Preamble to 
the Rome Statute, which says that the ICC was created, in part, 
to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” of the most 
serious crimes.212 Thus, international courts are supposed to 
strive to ensure that serious violations of international criminal 
law are followed by “effective prosecution” such that violations 
do not go unpunished.213 Ending impunity thus means ensuring 
that everybody who commits an international crime is effectively 
prosecuted. Unfortunately, success in achieving this goal is not 
wholly within the court’s control. Even assuming that an 
international court is successful in detaining and trying all of 
the individuals it indicts,214 there will still be a very large 
impunity gap because international tribunals have extremely 
limited capacity,215 but serious violations of international 
criminal law are almost always carried out by large hierarchical 
groups working together.216 International courts cannot try all 
of the perpetrators. In practice, courts have tended to focus on 
 
 211. See supra text accompanying note 58. See also Humphrey, supra note 
113, at 498 (“ The principal goal of prosecutions in international criminal 
tribunals has been to challenge impunity . . . .”); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 
128, at 495 (“[B]asic purpose of the ICC . . . is to fight impunity.”). 
 212. Rome Statute, supra note 51, pmbl. 
 213. Id. (“Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their 
effective prosecution must be ensured . . . .”). 
 214. This is probably an unrealistic assumption. See Yvonne M. Dutton, 
Enforcing the Rome Statute: Evidence of (Non) Compliance from Kenya, 26 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2016); Stuart Ford, The ICC and the Security 
Council: How Much Support is There for Ending Impunity?, 26 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 33, 62–63 (2016) [hereinafter Ford, The ICC and the Security 
Council] (arguing that ICC is relatively weak compared to states and the lack 
of state support has made it difficult for the court to succeed); Burke-White, 
supra note 58; Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26 at 38. 
 215. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 58, at 54. 
 216. See Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command 
Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 159, 159-60 (2007) (noting that 
international criminal violations are usually the result of the collective actions 
of many individuals working towards the same ends); Cassese, supra note 190, 
at 110 (“[I]nternational crimes . . . tend to be expression of collective 
criminality, in that they are perpetrated by groups of individuals, military 
details, paramilitary units or government officials acting in unison or in 
pursuance of a policy.”); Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: 
Evidence from the Indictments, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 45, 65–68 
(2013). 
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indicting and prosecuting senior leaders and those most 
responsible.217 One consequence of these limits is that the vast 
majority of low-level perpetrators are unlikely to be tried before 
an international court.218 This creates a serious impunity gap.219 
One way in which international courts help bridge this gap 
is by supporting national prosecutions.220 For example, the ICTY 
provided training and support to national prosecutions in the 
former Yugoslavia.221 In addition, it transferred some cases to 
national courts and provided national prosecutors with dossiers 
compiled by the ICTY on individuals the ICTY did not have the 
capacity to prosecute.222 The ICTR fostered cooperation with the 
Rwandan justice system, helping with local investigations and 
bringing Rwandan officials to Arusha to attend ICTR 
proceedings.223 The ICC, on the other hand, does not have the 
resources or the mandate to develop capacity amongst its 
member states.224 As such, it will not directly train prosecutors 
 
 217. See Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, 
Jan. 16 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145 (“There is hereby established a Special Court 
for Sierra Leone to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law . . . committed in the 
territory of Sierra Leone . . . .”); Akhavan, supra note 59, at 26 (“The ICRTR is 
not intended to substitute for the Rwandese judicial system, but to serve as a 
jurisdiction with limited resources focusing on the arrest and prosecution of the 
most senior accused.”); Ford, supra note 216, at 71–73 (noting that the ICTY 
initially indicted a number of low-ranking perpetrators but was pressured by 
the Security Council to focus on those most responsible for the violence, which 
in practice meant senior leaders). 
 218. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 743 (noting that because of limited 
resources and a focus on those most responsible for serious crimes, a number of 
lower-level perpetrators are not even investigated). 
 219. See Burke-White, supra note 58, at 74 (“An impunity gap arises where 
an international forum prosecutes only those most responsible for international 
crimes, leaving lesser offenders a degree of impunity.”). 
 220. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1974 (“[T]ribunal affiliates look to 
prosecutions as a means to catalyze future prosecutions . . . may similarly spark 
companion national prosecutions.”). 
 221. See Clark, supra note 60, at 423 (“The ICTY’s outreach department is 
now primarily focused on capacity-building work, that is to say on developing 
the capacity of local courts in the former Yugoslavia to prosecute war crimes.”). 
 222. See Ford, supra note 26, at 35–36 (noting that the ICTY transferred 
seven cases to domestic courts in the former Yugoslavia as well as seventeen 
dossiers containing evidence of crimes for which an ICTY indictment was never 
confirmed). 
 223. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 26. 
 224. See Morten Bergsmo et al., Complementarity after Kampala: Capacity 
Building and the ICC’s Legal Tools, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 791, 798, 802 
(2010) (noting that there is broad agreement that the court should not directly 
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or fund domestic investigations.225 It may assist in other ways, 
however. For example, the ICC can provide information it 
collects during its investigations to national systems and it can 
help catalyze assistance from other actors, including other 
states, international organizations and civil society groups.226 In 
addition, the ICC has contributed to a project called the Legal 
Tools Project to systematize and publicize documents relevant to 
international criminal law. This project is intended to make 
available the tools necessary for the practice of international 
criminal law in domestic jurisdictions.227 
The ICC may be able to promote domestic prosecutions in 
other ways as well. First, the ICC may simply be able to 
persuade states to undertake prosecutions.228 Second, the 
structure of the Rome Statute provides incentives for domestic 
prosecutions.229 Thus, the ICC may be able to help end impunity 
without taking on the cases itself or directly supporting national 
prosecutions. 
Calculating an expected value for ending impunity requires 
assessing both the likelihood that international tribunals can 
end impunity and the benefit that would accrue if that goal could 
be accomplished. The likelihood of ending impunity will be 
assessed first. The most direct way that international courts 
 
engage in domestic capacity building but that capacity building should be 
undertaken by states, international organizations and civil society); Burke-
White, supra note 61, at 84–85 (noting that the ICC does not have the capacity 
to engage in resource-intensive attempts to build domestic judicial capacity). 
 225. Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Ponds: International Crimes 
in National Courts, 90 IND. L. J. 829, 841–42 (2015). 
 226. Id. at n.90. 
 227. See Bergsmo et al., supra note 224, at 804–07. 
 228. Id. at 796 (noting that encouragement and persuasion can be effective 
in promoting domestic prosecutions); Burke-White, supra note 58, at 55. 
 229. Article 17 of the Rome Statute deprives the ICC of jurisdiction over a 
case if a state is making a genuine attempt to prosecute it. See Rome Statute, 
supra note 51, art. 17. As a result, states can prevent the ICC from exercising 
jurisdiction by undertaking their own investigations and prosecutions. This 
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prosecutions. See Bergsmo et al., supra note 229, at 795 (“States may feel 
‘forced’to investigate or prosecute cases involving core international crimes so 
as to avoid any intrusion by the ICC into situations involving their nationals or 
their territory.”); Burke-White, supra note 61, at 69–70 (noting that an ICC 
investigation imposes significant reputational and sovereignty costs on states 
and that states can avoid these costs by undertaking genuine investigations and 
prosecutions). But see Burke-White, supra note 61, at 62–63 (arguing that in 
some circumstances the ICC actually may decrease the likelihood of costly or 
politically sensitive prosecutions in national systems by permitting states to 
transfer responsibility for those cases to the ICC). 
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contribute to this goal is through arresting and trying those 
individuals they indict. But, international courts have not been 
completely successful in obtaining custody over and trying even 
the small number of individuals they indict. While the ICTY 
managed to eventually obtain custody over most of its 
indictees,230 it was not easy.231 The ICTR has been less 
successful – there are still eight fugitives from the ICTR.232 
For various reasons,233 the ICC has also had difficulty in 
obtaining custody over the individuals it has indicted.234 For 
example, senior Sudanese government officials have successfully 
evaded the ICC’s arrest warrants.235 Similarly, Joseph Kony, the 
leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army has successfully avoided 
arrest.236 The Prosecutor has also been forced to drop charges 
against senior Kenyan politicians due to their alleged 
manipulation and intimidation of witnesses.237 As this 
discussion shows, it is doubtful whether international courts can 
completely end impunity even for senior leaders. 
It is also very doubtful that international courts can 
successfully promote the domestic prosecutions necessary to 
close the impunity gap at the national level. First, many states 
 
 230. See Key Figures of the Cases, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL 
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visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
 233. See Ford, The ICC and the Security Council, supra note 214 (arguing 
that ICC is relatively weak compared to states and the lack of state support has 
made it difficult for the court to succeed). 
 234. See Burke-White, supra note 58. 
 235. See Ford, The ICC and the Security Council, supra note 214, at 38. 
 236. A warrant for his arrest was issued in 2005, but as of October 2016 he 
was still a fugitive. See Case Information Sheet for Joseph Kony and Vincent 
Otti, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony. 
 237. See Dutton, supra note 214, at 12–13 (2016). 
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lack the necessary legislation to investigate and prosecute 
violations of international law.238 Second, many states lack the 
capacity to undertake domestic prosecutions.239 They often do 
not have the necessary infrastructure, the necessary funding, or 
a qualified judiciary.240 This problem is compounded by the large 
number of cases that states would have to undertake to 
investigate and prosecute all of the potential defendants.241 
Third, state support for domestic prosecutions is not a given. In 
situations where the perpetrator groups are part of the 
government, the local authorities will often frustrate or oppose 
prosecutions rather than support them.242 Even if national 
prosecutions are undertaken, there is a risk that impunity will 
continue if the prosecutions are designed primarily to prevent 
ICC involvement rather than to ensure that justice is served.243 
Thus, there are good reasons to doubt that international 
criminal courts can promote the necessary domestic 
prosecutions to close the impunity gap. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that domestic 
prosecutions that have been spurred by international criminal 
courts. 244 For example, the work of the ICTY and ICTR appears 
to have triggered some domestic prosecutions of individuals 
involved in international crimes committed in Rwanda and the 
Balkans.245 The government of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) began a series of domestic prosecutions of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in response to the ICC’s 
initiation of a preliminary examination.246 On the other hand, 
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there has also been criticism of the “marginal influence” 
international criminal tribunals have had on domestic 
prosecutions.247 Ultimately, it seems unlikely that international 
courts can end impunity.248 They have not been able to end 
impunity for the senior leaders that have been the focus of their 
efforts.249 They are even less likely to be able to end impunity for 
the vastly more numerous lower-level perpetrators. 
The next step is to calculate the benefit that would result 
from ending impunity. This goal is functionally similar to the 
retribution goal but on a larger scale. After all, one of the main 
purposes of ending impunity is to ensure that perpetrators are 
identified and appropriately punished for their wrongful 
conduct.250 This is essentially retribution writ large. Rather than 
just trying a few leaders, if courts can end impunity, then all of 
the perpetrators—and there could be hundreds or thousands of 
them—will receive appropriate retribution. This suggests that 
ending impunity, if it could be achieved, would have a higher 
value than retribution. On the other hand, retribution has a low 
value to states.251 This suggests that ending impunity, as an end 
in itself, has only a moderate value. It may be morally 
appropriate to punish wrongdoers, but states will not pay huge 
sums to achieve a just punishment. 
Rather, there is considerable evidence that states primarily 
view ending impunity as a means to prevent violations.252 This 
can be seen most clearly in the Preamble to the Rome Statute, 
which says the ICC is intended “to put an end to impunity for 
the perpetrators of [the most serious] crimes and thus contribute 
to the prevention of such crimes.”253 Others theorize that ending 
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impunity is a mechanism to maintain or restore peace after a 
conflict.254 
Ultimately, it is unlikely that international tribunals truly 
have the ability to end impunity through their work.255 More 
importantly, the intrinsic value of ending impunity is 
moderate.256 Its main value is as a mechanism to prevent 
violations.257 
H. PREVENTING VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 
It is often argued that international criminal courts can 
prevent violations of international criminal law.258 For example, 
the Rome Statute argues that the ICC will “contribute to the 
prevention of” violations.259 There is less agreement, however, 
about how prevention works. Some argue that prevention will 
occur by deterring potential wrongdoers.260 According to this 
theory, people will not commit violations if the expected adverse 
consequences arising from the violation exceed the expected 
benefit.261 By punishing violations, courts can increase the 
expected costs of violations so that they exceed the expected 
benefits and thereby deter future violations.262 Others argue 
that by expressing condemnation for morally reprehensible acts, 
courts may be able to change norms about the commission of 
violations and thereby reduce violations.263 Another theory is 
that by taking actions which foster post-conflict reconciliation, 
courts can reduce the hostility and suspicion which can lead to 
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outbreaks of violence.264 
In addition to a number of different theories about how 
prevention might work, there is also considerable debate about 
whether any of the existing theories are viable.265 Thus, while 
deterrence has been advanced as a mechanism for preventing 
violations,266 there is also doubt about whether deterrence can 
work in the context of international criminal law.267 Some of the 
other theories about prevention have also been criticized as 
unworkable.268 There is even some concern that international 
prosecutions might cause more violations by encouraging the 
individuals responsible for the violence to cling to power.269 As a 
result, the theory related to prevention is extremely muddled. 
There is little agreement among international criminal law 
scholars about how prevention works or whether any of the 
commonly-articulated mechanisms are likely to prevent crimes. 
Even in the absence of a sound theoretical basis, however, 
there have been attempts to identify situations where 
international courts have prevented crimes.270 The best example 
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of this approach is by Professor Akhavan.271 He concluded that 
the ICC’s interventions in Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, and Darfur did 
not make those situations worse and, in fact, appeared to 
prevent some violence.272 On the other hand, commentators have 
noted that the indictment by the ICTY of senior leaders in the 
former Yugoslavia did not prevent those same individuals from 
sparking a new conflict in Kosovo in 1999.273 Ultimately, 
qualitative arguments are not likely to persuade those who are 
convinced that international courts cannot prevent violence. To 
convince the many doubters,274 a more systematic approach is 
required. 
Unlike most of the goals assessed in this Article, the 
question of whether international courts can prevent atrocities 
has been studied empirically.275 For example, Professor 
Hillebrecht has studied the effect of the initiation of an ICC 
investigation on the situation in Libya.276 Her study looked at 
the effect of various actions taken by the ICC on the number of 
 
about the prospect of ICC prosecution years before their indictment or arrest.”) 
(“Paramilitaries have reportedly cited the Court’s potential prosecution as part 
of their reasoning for relinquishing power.”); deGuzman, supra note 47, at 308 
(noting one instance in which the threat of ICC action appears to have deterred 
“hate speech that threatened to spark genocide”); Dutton, supra note 214, at 
19–22 (arguing that the ICC’s indictments of senior Kenyan leaders following 
post-election violence in 2008 led those same leaders to use much less combative 
rhetoric during the next election and ultimately led to much more peaceful 
elections in 2013). See also Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at 450 (noting several 
instances of human rights violators expressing concern about the possibility of 
an ICC indictment). 
 271. See Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a 
Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political 
Realism, 31 HUM RIGHTS Q. 624, 625 (2009) (using case studies of indictments 
for leaders in Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Sudan, Professor Akhavan argues that 
the ICC deters violence by raising the potential cost of it, rather than creating 
perverse incentives for leaders who have been indicted to continue committing 
human rights abuses to avoid arrest). 
 272. Id. at 636–52. 
 273. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (noting that hope for deterrence 
faded as the ad hoc tribunals appeared unable to prevent violations); Levitt, 
supra note 57, at 1965 (noting that both Serbian and Kosovar forces engaged in 
violations of international criminal law in Kosovo in 1999 and that the ICTY 
was not able to prevent those violations despite having indicted numerous 
individuals for violations of international criminal law in the Balkans). 
 274. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at 446 (listing scholars who have 
argued that the ICC cannot prevent violations). 
 275. See Hillebrecht, supra note 269; Jo & Simmons, supra note 258; James 
Meernik, The International Criminal Court and the Deterrence of Human 
Rights Atrocities, 17 CIVIL WARS 318 (2015). 
 276. See Hillebrecht, supra note 269. 
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civilians killed per day in Libya by pro-government forces.277 She 
found that civilian casualties decreased after the ICC took action 
in Libya and concluded that “the ICC can, in fact, serve as a 
deterrent of violence against civilians, particularly government-
sponsored civilian casualties, during ongoing conflict.”278 There 
are some caveats279 and the preventive effect she found is 
“modest.”280 Nevertheless, Professor Hillebrecht did find 
evidence that ICC intervention in Libya reduced the number of 
civilian casualties.281 
Professor Meernik has taken a slightly different approach to 
studying the effect of the ICC. He looked at the question of 
whether joining the ICC lowered the likelihood that a country 
would experience human rights violations.282 While the factor in 
his model with the largest impact on violence was a country’s 
commitment to the rule of law—countries with a strong 
commitment to the rule of law were much less likely to 
experience human rights violations—he found that a country’s 
commitment to the ICC was also a significant factor.283 
Countries that exhibited a strong commitment to the ICC had 
less violence than countries with a similar commitment to the 
rule of law but less commitment to the ICC.284 Professor Meernik 
also found that states with a strong commitment to the ICC were 
less likely to be the subject of ICC investigations.285 Ultimately, 
he concluded that his findings “support” the conclusion “that the 
ICC can exercise a deterrent impact.”286 
Professors Jo and Simmons have also assessed the 
preventive effect of the ICC. In their study, they focused on 
 
 277. Id. at 628–29. 
 278. Id. at 632. 
 279. For example, Professor Hillebrecht notes that the ICC in Libya acted 
with the support of both NATO and the Security Council and that the result 
might not be the same if the ICC were acting alone. Id. at 737–38. 
 280. Id. at 632. 
 281. Id. at 637. 
 282. See Meernik, supra note 275. 
 283. Id. at 331–33. See also id. at Tables 1, 2 & 3 (finding that ICC support 
had a statistically significant effect on the extent of human rights abuses). 
 284. Id. at 333 (“States that demonstrate further commitment to the ICC by 
enacting domestic legislation that provides for national prosecution of 
international crimes; by ratifying the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities 
for the ICC; and by refraining from concluding a bilateral immunity agreement 
with the United States are more likely to have better human rights records and 
be involved in less internal violence.”). 
 285. Id. at 334–35. 
 286. Id. at 333. 
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whether various actions reduced the level of civilian casualties 
during civil wars.287 They found that ICC ratification was 
associated with a nearly fifty percent decrease in the rate at 
which government forces killed civilians.288 They also found that 
as the number of prosecutorial acts by the ICC increased (e.g., 
opening of preliminary examinations, opening of formal 
investigations, and issuance of arrest warrants) the number of 
civilian deaths attributable to the government decreased.289 The 
incorporation of a state’s ICC obligations into domestic law was 
also associated with a decrease in civilian deaths caused by 
governments.290 These effects persisted even after controlling for 
numerous other factors that might affect civilian deaths.291 In 
contrast, Professors Jo and Simmons found less effect on rebel 
groups.292 Ultimately, they conclude that there is “strong 
evidence of a reduction in intentional civilian killing by 
government actors” as a result of the ICC.293 
The results of these empirical studies are surprisingly 
consistent. Although they used different methods, and looked at 
different data sets, they all found that ICC intervention was 
associated with a decrease in violence. While these studies 
cannot definitively prove that the ICC was the cause of the 
decrease in violence, the results are still persuasive evidence of 
such an effect. 
The magnitude of the effect, however, is uncertain. 
Professor Hillebrecht found that the ICC’s investigation in Libya 
only “modest[ly]” reduced violence against civilians.294 On the 
other hand, Professors Jo and Simmons found a nearly fifty 
percent reduction in civilians killed by government forces as a 
result of the ICC.295 More data will be necessary to pin down the 
 
 287. Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at Table 1. 
 288. Id. at 461. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 463. 
 291. Id. at 466 (“The evidence of the ICC’s ability to deter is based on 
rigorous controls for many underlying conditions that could plausibly contribute 
both to ratification and reduced civilian killing, such as changing regime type, 
quality of the rule of law, government-rebel reciprocity regarding civilians, even 
changing experiences and preference with respect to peace and justice.”). 
 292. Rebel groups did not appear to be affected by ICC ratification or the 
incorporation of ICC obligations into domestic legal systems. The number of 
civilian deaths caused by rebels did decrease as the number of ICC actions 
increased, but the effect was smaller than for government forces. Id. at 469–70. 
 293. Id. at 469. 
 294. See Hillebrecht, supra note 269, at 632. 
 295. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at 461. 
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magnitude of the ICC’s effect. While it is unclear how much the 
ICC reduces violence, it is clear that it does not completely 
eliminate it. This suggests that while significant violence will be 
prevented, many acts of violence will still occur. Thus for 
purposes of this Article, the likelihood of the ICC preventing any 
particular potential act of violence is rated as unlikely. 
Having estimated the likelihood of preventing violations of 
international criminal law, the next step is to try to estimate the 
benefit that would accrue if violations could be prevented. 
Serious violations of international criminal law have a number 
of hallmarks. They usually occur during or are associated with 
armed conflicts.296 They are typically carried out by 
hierarchically-organized groups working together,297 and the 
victims are usually civilians, often women and children.298 The 
most common crimes consist of rapes and murders, the infliction 
of torture and other inhumane acts, the wholesale destruction of 
homes, businesses and public infrastructure, and the forcible 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from their 
homes.299 They are often carried out with exceptional cruelty.300 
These crimes have enormous costs and consequences for both the 
victims and societies in which they occur. 
We know that being a victim of a crime can have serious 
consequences for the individual.301 These effects can include 
shock and loss of trust in society, guilt at having been the victim 
of a crime, temporary or permanent incapacity stemming from 
physical injuries, financial losses, psychological changes, 
including fear, anger and depression, and social effects that 
change an individual’s lifestyle.302 Many of these effects can also 
be felt by the families, friends, and colleagues of the victim.303 
While the vast majority of crime victims will feel some 
emotional effect of the crime,304 victims of violence and sexual 
assault are more likely to be affected by the crime than victims 
of non-violent crimes and it is more likely that the effects will 
 
 296. See Ford, supra note 4, at Section II(C). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. See Joanna Shapland and Matthew Hall, What Do We Know About the 
Effect of Crime on Victims?, 14 INT’L R. OF VICTIMOLOGY 175, 178–79 (2007). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id.at 179. 
 304. Id. at 181 (noting that more than eighty percent of crime victims report 
being emotionally affected by the crime). 
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persist over the long term.305 Thus, violent crimes tend to have 
a larger impact than other kinds of crime. And, of course, the 
widespread commission of violent crimes is the hallmark of 
violations of international criminal law. 
Most studies of the effect of crime on victims take place in 
countries that are at peace. Nevertheless, the small amount of 
research on the effect of crimes committed during conflicts 
supports the conclusion that victims of conflict-related violent 
crimes are highly likely to suffer severely.306 Indeed, even those 
who are “only” subjected to forced displacement nonetheless 
suffer significant harm.307 
Above and beyond the direct effects on the victims and their 
friends and families, crime can also have very serious economic 
costs for society as a whole.308 The most common direct costs of 
crime are for medical care, property loss, and costs associated 
with the criminal justice system.309 Indirect costs can include 
things like loss of productivity.310 Unsurprisingly, physical 
violence, particularly murder, appears to generate the largest 
societal costs compared to other forms of crime.311 In developed 
countries, where most of the research is conducted, the economic 
costs of crime run into the billions of dollars per year.312 
While most of the research on the costs of crime has focused 
on the kinds of crimes that are most common in domestic 
systems, there have also been some studies of the economic 
effects of mass atrocities on society. That research shows that 
serious violations of international criminal law have enormous 
costs. For example, the economic cost of the conflict in Darfur is 
estimated to be tens of billions of dollars.313 A study of the cost 
 
 305. Id. at 196–97. 
 306. Id. at 199–200. 
 307. See, e.g., James M. Shultz et al., Internally Displaced “Victims of Armed 
Conflict” in Colombia: The Trajectory and Trauma Signature of Forced 
Migration, 16 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPORTS, at 4 (2014) (“IDPs [internally 
displaced persons] experience extraordinary adversities, overt danger, and 
psychological distress throughout all phases along the trajectory of 
displacement, leading to chronic elevation of risks for victimization, physical 
ailments, and mental disorders.”). 
 308. See also Nyantara Wickramasekera et al., Cost of Crime: A Systematic 
Review, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 218 (2015). 
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 313. See Hamid E. Ali, Estimate of the Economic Cost of Armed Conflict: A 
Case Study from Darfur, 24 DEF. & PEACE ECON. 503 (2012). 
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of the Rwandan genocide argued that Rwandan GDP would have 
been twenty-five to thirty percent higher if the genocide had not 
taken place.314 These findings are consistent with a body of 
research that has found that widespread violence within a 
society has very significant economic consequences.315 
In short, the cost of the crimes associated with the kinds of 
conflicts where international criminal courts become involved 
are enormous and can easily be in the tens to hundreds of 
billions of dollars.316 This suggests that preventing those crimes 
would have an extremely high value because it would avoid 
those costs. For this reason, this Article assigns the prevention 
of serious violations of international criminal law an extremely 
high value. 
I. MAINTAINING OR RESTORING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND 
SECURITY 
International criminal courts are sometimes tasked with 
maintaining or restoring international peace and security.317 
This goal appears to be the one that is most divorced from the 
actual work of courts because no modern international criminal 
court has had jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, although 
that is set to change in July 2018 when the ICC will be permitted 
to exercise jurisdiction over aggression.318 This means that no 
 
 314. See Humberto Lopez & Quentin Wodon, The Economic Impact of Armed 
Conflict in Rwanda, 14 J. AFR. ECON. 586 (2005). See also Pieter Serneels & 
Marjike Verpoorten, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Economic Performance: 
Evidence from Rwanda, 59 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 555 (2015) (finding that the 
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economic performance). 
 315. See Sanjeev Gupta et al., Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict and 
Terrorism in Low and Middle-Income Countries (Fiscal Affairs Department, 
IMF Working Paper No. 02/142, 2002); see also Alberto Abadie & Javier 
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Country, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 113 (2003); Anke Hoeffler & Marta Reynal-Querol, 
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Nicholas Staines, Economic Performance Over the Conflict Cycle (IMF Working 
Paper WP/04/95, 2004). 
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was somewhere between $60 and $250 billion. See Paul Collier et al., The 
Security Challenge in Post-Conflict Countries 19–20 (April 2008). 
 317. See supra Section III (explaining the goals of international criminal 
courts). 
 318. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 15 bis (establishing jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression); Dapo Akande, The International Criminal Court 
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court has been able to punish a party that wrongfully started an 
armed conflict. As a result, there was little likelihood that 
international courts could deter the initiation of conflicts, at 
least in the sense that deterrence is usually used in domestic 
criminal law.319 Nevertheless, there are some theories about how 
international criminal tribunals can help restore and maintain 
peace and security even in the absence of jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression. One theory is that by indicting and 
convicting the architects of the violence for other violations of 
international criminal law, courts may be able to remove the 
individuals most likely to spark a new armed conflict.320 Even if 
a court cannot directly remove the architects of violence from 
power, an indictment may isolate them and weaken their grip 
on power.321 Another theory posits that by fostering post-conflict 
reconciliation, courts can defuse the hostility and suspicion that 
might lead to later conflicts.322 On the other hand, there has been 
a concern that criminal indictments could exacerbate conflict by 
causing the participants to resist peace.323 Luckily, there is little 
evidence that intervention by courts makes conflicts worse.324 
 
 
Gets Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, EJIL:TALK! (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-international-criminal-court-gets-jurisdiction-
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a resolution permitting the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
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 319. Deterrence theory requires that the act be subject to some sort of 
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 320. See Turner, supra note 13, at 538 (arguing that by removing the 
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the chance of future violence); see also Akhavan, supra note 59, at 7 (“The 
removal of leaders with criminal dispositions and a vested interest in conflict 
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 321. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 7 (arguing that, even if indicted leaders 
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grip on power and make further violations more costly and thus less attractive). 
 322. See supra text accompanying notes 196–203, 207 (arguing that 
international criminal courts can foster post-conflict reconciliation). 
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230 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1 
There have been various attempts to demonstrate that 
courts can (or cannot) prevent conflicts. For example, Professor 
Akhavan argues that the ICTY helped to de-legitimize Slobodan 
Milošević325 and that the ICTR helped prevent Hutu extremists 
from returning to power.326 On the other side, several 
commentators have noted that the ICTY’s intervention in the 
Balkans did not prevent the conflict in Kosovo in 1999.327 More 
recently, the ICC has had little luck ending the conflict in Darfur 
despite indicting President Bashir.328 In the end, the evidence 
that courts can prevent conflicts before they begin or end them 
after they have begun is weak.329 Indeed, in general, we do not 
know how to predict when conflicts will occur or how to prevent 
them when they do occur.330 Ultimately, the theoretical 
underpinnings of this goal are lacking,331 and there is little 
evidence that international courts have been able to prevent 
conflicts.332 Consequently, it is unlikely that international 
criminal courts can prevent conflicts from occurring.333 
 
 325. Akhavan, supra note 59, at 9 (“[T]he work of the ICTY . . . has permitted 
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Having addressed the likelihood that this goal can be 
achieved, the next step is to assess what value achieving the goal 
would have. This will be done by comparing its value to the value 
of preventing violations. Restoring or maintaining international 
peace and security is often listed as a separate goal from that of 
preventing violations of international law, but in practice they 
are aimed at achieving similar effects. The main purpose of 
preventing violations of international criminal law is to stop the 
violence against civilians that is associated with armed 
conflicts.334 Restoring or maintaining peace would have a similar 
effect by preventing the conflict that leads to the violence.335 In 
short, both appear to be directed largely at preventing the 
 
prosecutions) before we can draw any conclusions about whether having 
jurisdiction over aggression makes it easier for the ICC to prevent or end 
conflicts. 
 334. The focus on violence associated with armed conflicts is technically 
inaccurate because genocide and crimes against humanity can occur outside an 
armed conflict. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, arts. 6–7 (describing the legal 
elements of genocide and crimes against humanity; neither requires the 
existence of an armed conflict as a jurisdictional requirement). However, in 
practice, genocide and crimes against humanity often occur alongside armed 
conflicts. Two of the nine current ICC investigations involves a possibility of 
genocide and both occurred in the context of an armed conflict. See Ford, supra 
note 4, at Table 1. Of the eight situations the ICC is currently investigating that 
involve crimes against humanity, six took place during an armed conflict. Id. 
Thus, most violations of international criminal law are associated with conflicts 
even if that is not a legal requirement of crimes against humanity or genocide. 
As a result, it is fair to say that international criminal courts are primarily 
interested in stopping the violence associated with armed conflicts, even though 
they can (and occasionally do) have jurisdiction over violence that occurs outside 
of an armed conflict. 
 335. Again, this is slightly inaccurate because crimes against humanity and 
genocide are prohibited by international criminal law but can occur outside of 
an armed conflict. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, arts. 6–7; Ford, supra note 
4, at Table 1. Thus preventing armed conflicts would not necessarily prevent all 
violations of international criminal law. Nevertheless, crimes against humanity 
and genocide would likely constitute a threat to international peace and 
security even when such crimes are not committed during an armed conflict. 
For example, when the United Nations Security Council referred the situation 
in Libya to the ICC, it found that there were “widespread and systematic 
attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the 
civilian population [that] may amount to crimes against humanity” but it did 
not conclude that there was on ongoing armed conflict. See S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 
26, 2011). However, the Security Council suggested that the attacks were a 
threat to international peace and security and used its enforcement powers 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to refer the matter to the ICC 
and impose an arms embargo. Id. Consequently, this article will assume that 
achieving the peace and security goal would include preventing all violations of 
international criminal law even if they do not take place during an armed 
conflict. 
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violence that accompanies armed conflicts.336 The question then 
becomes, is the goal of preserving international peace and 
security actually different from the goal of prevention? The 
answer is that there are some differences, but they are relatively 
small and those differences may disappear completely in the 
future. 
Modern international criminal courts have had jurisdiction 
over three crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide.337 Much of the violence that occurs during armed 
conflicts would be prevented by compliance with these laws, but 
not all of it. Some types of violence are permitted during an 
armed conflict. For example, combatants are permitted to target 
and kill other combatants during conflicts.338 They are also 
permitted to attack and destroy military objectives.339 In some 
limited circumstances, they are even permitted to cause civilian 
casualties and damage civilian objects.340 In effect, there is some 
violence that occurs during armed conflicts that is neither a war 
crime, a crime against humanity, nor genocide. Mainly, this 
harm is directed towards participating combatants and military 
objects. Such harm would be eliminated by maintaining or 
restoring international peace and security but would not be 
prevented simply by compliance with the law covering war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. This suggests 
that the value of achieving the goal of maintaining peace is 
higher than the value of achieving the goal of preventing 
 
 336. As noted above, this is slightly inaccurate because violations of 
international criminal law can occur outside of an armed conflict. See supra note 
334. Most violations, however, do occur in connection with an armed conflict. 
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violations of international criminal law because more harm 
would be prevented. 
Its value may not be much higher, however. The amount of 
additional value that preventing conflicts would produce over 
preventing violations of international criminal law depends 
largely on the ratio of civilian to combatant deaths during 
conflict. If combatants represent the majority of conflict-related 
deaths then preventing conflicts would have considerably more 
value than just preventing violations of international criminal 
law. If, on the other hand, civilian deaths constituted the vast 
majority of conflict-related deaths, then the added value of 
preventing combatant deaths might not be very large. It is hard, 
however, to be certain of the ratio of combatant to civilian 
deaths. While many sources suggest that ninety percent of the 
dead in modern conflicts are civilians, it is doubtful the ratio of 
combatant to civilian deaths is that high.341 Nevertheless, it does 
appear that civilian deaths are significantly more numerous 
than combatant deaths in most modern conflicts.342 Thus, the 
additional value provided by preventing combatant deaths may 
be relatively small compared to the value provided by preventing 
civilian deaths because there are significantly fewer combatant 
deaths. 
This conclusion is complicated somewhat by plans for the 
ICC to assume jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in July 
2018.343 When this occurs, the ICC will have the authority to 
prosecute individuals for causing armed conflicts.344 At that 
point, the goal of preventing violations of international criminal 
law will include the goal of preventing conflicts. The addition of 
aggression to the ICC’s jurisdiction will have the effect of 
 
 341. See Adam Roberts, Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims 
Civilians?, 52 SURVIVAL 115 (2010) (arguing that the ninety percent statistic is 
not supported by reliable data). 
 342. See id. at 126 (acknowledging that a number of recent conflicts in Africa 
appear to have had high civilian to combatant death ratios and that these 
conflicts may be “typical of the post-Cold War world”). See also Valerie Epps, 
Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral Damage 
Rule, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 329 (2013) (“Nonetheless, it seems more 
than fair to conclude that since the turn of the twentieth century, civilian deaths 
have outnumbered military deaths in nearly all wars.”). 
 343. See supra note 318. 
 344. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 8 bis (“‘[A]ct of aggression’ means 
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political independence of another State . . . . Any of the following acts . . . 
shall . . . qualify as an act of aggression: The invasion or attack by the armed 
forces of a State of the territory of another State . . . .”). 
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rendering the goal of preventing violations of international 
criminal law virtually co-extensive with the goal of maintaining 
international peace and security. 
Leaving aside for now the effect of granting the ICC 
jurisdiction over aggression,345 it appears the value of achieving 
the goal of maintaining and restoring peace and security has a 
modestly higher value than the goal of preventing violations of 
international criminal law. Given that prevention was given an 
extremely high value, achieving the goal of maintaining or 
restoring international peace and security will also be assigned 
an extremely high value. This means that this goal is extremely 
unlikely to occur but also extremely valuable when it does occur. 
VI. A HIERARCHY OF THE GOALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
It is now possible to fill in the expected value matrix. The 
completed matrix is presented as Table 2 below. It contains the 
likelihood that each goal will be achieved and the value that 
would occur if the goal was achieved. At some level, the results 
are not surprising. The goals that are easiest to achieve have low 
values, while some of the harder to achieve goals have higher 
values. In essence, there is no low-hanging fruit. The goals that 
are worth the most are not easy to achieve. 
There is only one goal that international criminal courts are 
likely to achieve in most trials—retribution.346 This is to be 
expected because assigning responsibility for violations of the 
law and punishing the guilty is fundamentally what courts are 
designed to do. Thus, it is not surprising that they are better at 
accomplishing this than their other goals, which are all less 
closely connected to the day-to-day work of courts. 
Unfortunately, the evidence indicates that states do not attach 
a particularly high value to this goal, and it seems unlikely that 
international criminal courts would continue to be created and 
funded if this was the only thing they accomplished. Therefore, 
retribution cannot be the principal goal of such courts, even 
though it is the most immediate result of the work of those 
courts. 
 
 345. See supra note 333 (noting that it may take a decade or more before any 
firm conclusions about the effect of granting the ICC jurisdiction over 
aggression can be drawn). 
 346. See supra Section V.A. 
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 Likelihood of benefit occurring 
 
Next come four goals that courts are only moderately likely 
to achieve in any particular situation: 1) establishing an 
accurate historical record; 2) expressing condemnation of 
morally abhorrent conduct; 3) developing international criminal 
law; and 4) fostering post-conflict reconciliation. Each of them 
has been assigned a low value (even assuming they can be 
achieved). At first glance, this may seem surprising. Three of 
these goals, establishing the record, expressing condemnation, 
and fostering reconciliation, have been advocated as important 
goals of international criminal courts by at least some 
commentators.347 
While it is true that these have been described as important 
 
 347. See supra text accompany notes 121, 163–164, 207–208. Developing 
international criminal law, on the other hand, has rarely been described as a 
principal goal of international courts. See sources cited supra note 189. 
Moreover, it is fairly clear that states are opposed to courts taking on this duty 
and would prefer to do the development themselves so that they can control its 
direction. See sources cited supra note 191. Assigning it a low value is probably 
not controversial. 
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goals of courts, it is more accurate to describe them as 
mechanisms by which other (more valuable) goals may be 
achieved. There is undoubtedly some intrinsic value in 
establishing what occurred, in expressing condemnation, and 
helping societies reconcile after conflict, but the value of these as 
ends in themselves is not high. Rather, these “goals” are usually 
advanced as a means to accomplish something else. Expressing 
condemnation is usually advocated as a means to establish 
global norms of conduct in the hope that this will prevent 
violations of international criminal law.348 Similarly, 
establishing an accurate historical record is argued to be a 
means to foster post-conflict reconciliation,349 which itself is 
often offered as a means to prevent future violations.350 In short, 
these three “goals” are best thought of as mechanisms by which 
future violations of international criminal law may be prevented. 
As a result, they have low intrinsic value. 
Next is ending impunity.351 It seems unlikely that 
international criminal courts can end impunity. They cannot 
even end impunity for the senior leaders that they are designed 
to investigate and prosecute, and they are poorly positioned to 
end impunity for the vastly larger number of lower-ranking 
perpetrators who actually carry out the atrocities. Moreover, 
even if it could be achieved, this goal has only a moderate value. 
It is essentially retribution on a grander scale, but states have 
shown little interest in retribution as an end in itself. Rather, 




Providing closure to victims has an even lower expected 
value than ending impunity.352 First, international criminal 
courts are not able to provide closure for the vast majority of 
victims. International tribunals charge only a small subset of the 
crimes that have been committed in any given situation. Thus, 
most victims will be excluded from the court’s work because the 
crimes that victimized them will not be prosecuted. Moreover, 
states’ contributions to the Trust Fund for Victims suggest they 
place a low value on providing closure and redress for victims. 
 
 348. See supra Section V.D. 
 349. See supra Section V.B. 
 350. See supra Section V.F. 
 351. See supra Section V.G. 
 352. See supra Section V.C. 
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This leaves two goals to discuss: preventing violations and 
maintaining or restoring peace and security. While these goals 
are conceptually distinct, in practice, they are aimed at 
accomplishing something quite similar: both are aimed at 
minimizing the violence associated with conflict.353 Maintaining 
or restoring peace and security has a slightly higher value than 
prevention when it occurs because it would prevent more harm, 
but it is also less likely to occur. As a result it has a lower 
expected value than prevention. Both goals, if they could be 
achieved, would prevent enormous harm from occurring. 
Qualitative and theoretical assessments of whether courts 
can prevent violations have resulted in intense disagreements 
about whether this goal can be achieved.354 Of all the goals 
discussed in this Article, however, only this one has been studied 
empirically. Perhaps surprisingly in light of the dispute in the 
theoretical literature, all of the empirical studies have found 
that the ICC reduced violations, sometimes by significant 
amounts. Given the enormous value of preventing violations, 
finding that the ICC does reduce violations means that this goal 
has a very high expected value. 
Table 2 provides important information about the hierarchy 
of the goals of international criminal courts. Retribution should 
be higher in the hierarchy than establishing an accurate 
historical record, expressing condemnation of morally abhorrent 
conduct, developing international criminal law, or fostering 
post-conflict reconciliation because it has a similar value when 
achieved but is more likely to be achieved. Similarly, providing 
closure for victims should come behind all of these goals because 
it is even less likely to occur but has a similar value when it does 
occur. Preventing violations has a higher expected value than 
maintaining or restoring peace because they both have 
extremely high values when they occur but prevention is more 
likely to occur. Ending impunity has a higher expected value 
than providing closure to victims because it occurs at about the 
same rate but has a greater benefit when it does occur. By the 
same logic, it has less value than prevention because it has a 
much lower benefit when it does occur, even though it occurs at 
about the same rate. 
This certainly helps explain the relationships between the 
goals, but it is not enough on its own to create a complete 
 
 353. See supra Section V.I. 
 354. See supra Section V.H. 
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hierarchy. The main problem is that Table 2 does not dictate how 
to rank the expected value of retribution against prevention. 
Once the relationship between these two goals is established, the 
rest of the list falls into place. 
There are several different arguments that lead to the 
conclusion that prevention should be highest in the hierarchy. 
First, retribution cannot be the principal purpose of 
international criminal courts because states assign it a low 
value, yet they continue to join and fund such courts.355 This 
suggests that they believe courts achieve some other goal, but 
retribution has a higher expected value than most of the other 
candidates, including developing international criminal law, 
expressing condemnation, record-setting, post-conflict 
reconciliation, and providing closure. This only leaves three 
other possibilities: prevention, maintaining peace and security, 
and ending impunity. Prevention has the highest expected value 
of these three goals, which strongly suggests this is the real 
reason states join and support international tribunals. And 
indeed, the Rome Statute expressly identifies prevention as a 
key goal of the ICC.356 
Second, it is striking that many of the “goals” of 
international criminal courts that have been advanced by 
scholars and commentators are better thought of as mechanisms 
to prevent violations. Expressing condemnation, establishing a 
historical record, fostering post-conflict reconciliation, and 
ending impunity have all been advanced as ways to prevent 
violations.357 This implies that prevention is the most important 
goal of international criminal courts. 
 
Third, while prevention is less likely to occur than 
retribution, it is not that much less likely. The empirical studies 
of prevention all suggest that the ICC has somewhere between a 
modest and a significant impact on the violence associated with 
mass atrocities. We do not know the exact likelihood that it will 
reduce violence because there have been a limited number of 
empirical studies of prevention and they do not agree on the size 
of the reduction, but a conservative assumption is that it is 
something like an order of magnitude less likely to occur than 
retribution.358 Since expected value is the product of the 
 
 355. See supra Sections II and V.A. 
 356. See supra text accompanying note 259. 
 357. See supra Section V.H. 
 358. In fact, it may be considerably more likely to occur than this. At least 
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likelihood of occurrence and the benefit that would occur if the 
goal were achieved, then prevention will have more expected 
value than retribution if its benefit is greater than an order of 
magnitude larger than the benefit from retribution.359 There is 
good reason to believe that the benefit that would be realized 
from prevention is several orders of magnitude greater than the 
benefit that would be realized from retribution. 
Preventing the widespread violence associated with serious 
violations of international criminal law has a value that runs 
into the tens to hundreds of billion dollars of value per conflict.360 
And this is only the part of the value that can be easily 
measured—the direct economic costs of violence. There are also 
substantial intangible costs like the pain and suffering of the 
victims, which are hard to measure but are also avoided if 
violence is prevented. In contrast, the expected value of 
retribution is probably less than the annual budget of the ICC, 
which is about $130 million per year.361 In other words, the 
benefits of prevention outweigh the benefits of retribution by 
several orders of magnitude. Thus, even though retribution is 
more likely to occur, it has a significantly lower expected value 
than prevention. 
 
Finally, prevention’s preeminence over retribution can be 
seen by imagining two different worlds. In the first world, 
serious violations of international criminal law occur, and 
international courts and domestic courts combine to fairly 
adjudicate those violations. The trials have the effect of 
providing appropriate retribution for all those responsible (thus 
leaving no impunity gap). They also establish an accurate 
historical record, provide an opportunity for closure to the 
victims, express condemnation of those same crimes, and foster 
post-conflict reconciliation. Finally, the court’s decisions 
 
one study found a reduction in violence of nearly fifty perent under some 
circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 287–288. 
 359. This assumes, as argued above, that prevention is at most an order of 
magnitude less likely to occur than retribution. 
 360. See supra Section V.H. 
 361. In 2016, the ICC had a budget of 139 million Euros. See Assembly of 
State Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 2017 of the International 
Criminal Court, Doc. ICC-ASP/15/10, at Table 1 (Aug. 17, 2016). The exchange 
rate on Dec. 30, 2016, was 1.05 dollars per Euro. See Foreign Exchange Rates – 
H.10, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federal
reserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat00_eu.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). The 
ICC’s budget was thus $132 million in 2016. Id. 
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contribute to the further development of international criminal 
law. This is a world in which essentially almost all of the hoped-
for results of international tribunals except for prevention occur. 
In other words, except for preventing violations, this is close to 
the best-case scenario for such courts. This first world is an 
unlikely outcome,362 but that is not the point. 
Now imagine a second world which is identical to the first 
world except that the violations of international criminal law 
that were adjudicated in the first world did not take place 
because the work of an international court prevented them from 
occurring. None of the other consequences present in the first 
world would occur. There would be no trials, no assigning of 
responsibility, no establishment of the historical record, and no 
post-conflict reconciliation. There would be no closure for 
victims, no condemnation of the crimes, and no development of 
international law. There would, however, be prevention of the 
violations in the first place. This would undoubtedly be the 
better of the two worlds. 
Serious violations of international criminal law cause 
massive harm. The victims suffer severe physical, psychological 
and economic harm, so do their friends, neighbors and co-
workers. There are also enormous economic costs for society as 
a whole. Moreover, international courts can do little to mitigate 
the effects of violations. Their principal job is to determine 
whether the accused is guilty.363 They have little authority to 
remedy the consequences of the accused’s actions.364 In this 
regard, the ICC is something of an outlier because it has a 
mandate to try to provide reparations to victims.365 It is, 
however, essentially an unfunded mandate.366 In theory, the ICC 
 
 362. See Table 2 (noting that many of these goals are only moderately likely 
or unlikely to occur). See also supra text accompanying notes 67–71 (noting the 
tension between the various goals and the expected difficulty of achieving all of 
them). 
 363. See supra Section II. 
 364. See Adrian Giovanni, The Prospect of ICC Reparations in the Case 
Concerning Northern Uganda: On a Collision Course with Incoherence?, 2 J. 
INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 25, 26 (2005) (noting that the ICC was the first 
international court to be given the power to provide reparations to victims). 
 365. Id. See also Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 75 (laying out the court’s 
authority to order perpetrators to provide “restitution, compensation, and 
rehabilitation” to victims); id. art. 79 (establishing a trust fund for the benefit 
of victims). 
 366. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312 (“[T]he ICC does not have the 
resources or proximity to local populations to make significant direct 
contributions to restoring victims or communities that have suffered mass 
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can order convicted perpetrators to pay for reparations to their 
victims, but most defendants claim indigence.367 Thus, whatever 
the theoretical benefits of reparations, they cannot hope to 
mitigate the economic costs of serious violations of international 
criminal law.368 The available evidence suggests that trials are 
not particularly good at remedying the non-economic 
consequences of crime either.369 
The resulting situation is one in which the costs of 
international criminal law violations are enormous both for 
society and for individuals within society, but the outputs that 
courts produce (trials) have little likelihood of ameliorating 
those harms after they have occurred. This suggests that 
prevention has a vastly higher actual value when it occurs than 
all of the other goals attributed to international tribunals put 
together. Or, to go back to our thought experiment, the world in 
which the crimes are never committed is a better world than the 
one in which they were committed but a court successfully 
adjudicated them, assigned responsibility, provided closure for 
victims, established the historical record, and fostered post-
conflict reconciliation. As the old saying goes: an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure.370 
 
violence.”); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 490–91 (“[T]he resources 
available for reparations will probably not allow the Court to meet the 
expectations of all victims. . . . Reparations for victims risk being more symbolic 
than real.”). 
 367. See Linda M. Keller, Seeking Justice at the International Criminal 
Court: Victims’ Reparations, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 189, 195–197 (2007); Van 
den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 490 (“[M[ost accused have arrived in the 
Court’s Detention Centre penniless.”). 
 368. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312 (“[T]he very limited amount of 
reparations the Court [ICC] can provide to a small number of victims hardly 
offers a convincing justification for its work.”); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 
128, at 490 (“[T]he Fund [Trust Fund] has very limited resources, by far 
insufficient to provide anything more than nominal sums to individual 
victims.”). 
 369. See Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal 
Proceedings, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 313, 319 (2002) (finding that two-thirds of the 
crime victims in their study felt that the trial of the perpetrator had a negative 
impact on them). See also Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of 
Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. TRAUMATIC 
STRESS 182 (2010) (reviewing research on whether criminal justice involvement 
is beneficial or detrimental for crime victims and finding the results to be 
mixed). 
 370. Cf. Daniel Kiel, An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: 
Reframing the Debate About Law School Affirmative Action, 88 DENV. L. REV. 
791, 791 n.3 (2011) (attributing the saying “an ounce of prevention is worth a 
pound of cure” to Benjamin Franklin). 
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For these reasons, prevention has a significantly higher 
expected value than retribution. In fact, prevention has the 
highest expected value of any of the goals and goes first in the 
hierarchy. Maintaining and restoring international peace and 
security comes next, as it has only a slightly lower expected 
value than prevention.371 Next is retribution. After retribution 
comes record-setting, post-conflict reconciliation, expressing 
condemnation, and developing international law. These four 
goals have approximately equal expected value and are thus tied 
for fourth place in the hierarchy.372 Although there is some 
uncertainty about its proper placement,373 ending impunity has 
also been placed amongst the goals tied for fourth place. Finally, 
providing closure for victims comes fifth.374 The hierarchy is 
presented below in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Hierarchy of the Goals of International Criminal Courts 
1. Preventing violations of international criminal law 
2. Maintaining or restoring peace and security 
3. Retribution 
4. Establishing an accurate historical record 
Expressing condemnation of morally abhorrent conduct 
Fostering post-conflict reconciliation 
Developing international criminal law 
Ending impunity 
5. Providing closure for victims 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
There are many goals that international criminal courts 
have been urged to achieve, but they do not have the resources 
to pursue them all simultaneously. Consequently, having a 
recognized hierarchy amongst them would help courts focus 
their limited resources where it matters most. But despite 
recognition that the lack of a hierarchy has hindered courts, 
until now, there have been no attempts to establish a formal 
 
 371. See supra Section V.I. 
 372. See Table 2. 
 373. Theoretically, ending impunity could also come before or after the goals 
that are tied for fourth place. Each of those placements would be consistent with 
its location in the expected value matrix. See Table 2. 
 374. See Table 2. 
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hierarchy amongst the goals of international criminal courts. 
This Article is the first attempt to create a hierarchy of the 
goals of international criminal law. It is unlikely that it will be 
last word on this issue. Some scholars may disagree with the 
ordering of specific goals. Others may propose different 
methodologies for assessing the relative merits of the different 
goals. But it is clear that much can be learned from the process 
of trying to create such a hierarchy rather than simply 
considering each goal in isolation. If others will take up the 
question of how to assess the goals of international criminal 
courts, it may be possible to reach a consensus on the 
appropriate hierarchy. This would have enormous benefits for 
international courts as they could use this information to focus 
their limited resources where they will do the most good. 
This Article has also identified an important distinction 
between goals and mechanisms that should be central to any 
later discussion of the goals of international criminal courts. 
Many of the goals that have been advocated by scholars turn out, 
upon closer inspection, to be mechanisms for the achievement of 
some other goal. This is understandable when one focuses on one 
goal at a time, but when all the goals are considered 
simultaneously, the distinction between a goal and a mechanism 
becomes very important. Once the goals that are primarily 
mechanisms for the achievement of some other more important 
goal (record-setting, post-conflict reconciliation, expressing 
condemnation, and ending impunity) are stripped away, we end 
up with five goals that appear to function largely as goals: 
retribution, developing international law, closure for victims, 
maintaining peace and security, and prevention. 
Prevention is at the top of the hierarchy because it has both 
an extremely high value when it does occur and we now have 
good evidence that courts can prevent violations. This means 
that courts should make prevention their primary focus. 
Unfortunately, this does not tell us what courts should actually 
do; we do not yet know how courts prevent violations, although 
there are many theories.375 The question of what mechanisms 
are best to prevent violations is an extremely important one and 
further work is necessary. Having provided evidence that 
international criminal courts can prevent violations, the next 
step for empiricists is to look at ways to test the various 
 
 375. See supra Section V.H (describing various theories about how 
international courts can prevent violations of international criminal law). 
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prevention mechanisms that have been advanced. If the 
mechanisms that best prevent violations can be identified, then 
courts will know how to achieve their primary goal. Still, 
knowing which goals are most important is a significant 
achievement. Before courts can decide how best to achieve their 
goals, they need to know which goals they should aim to achieve. 
Some goals do not seem like good choices for courts to 
pursue. In particular, seeking closure for victims, despite its 
popularity with many civil society groups, seems to offer little in 
the way of expected value. Courts are unlikely to achieve closure 
for most victims and even when it is achieved, it probably has 
modest value for most victims. Yet, courts and civil society 
groups devote considerable resources to this goal. The results of 
this Article suggest that those resources would be better utilized 
elsewhere. 
Instead, courts should focus on prevention as their primary 
goal.376 We now know that courts can prevent at least some of 
the violence associated with international crimes and that 
prevention has enormous benefits for both individuals and 
societies. Accordingly, courts should devote their resources to 
preventing violations of international criminal law. 
 
 376. Maintaining or restoring peace comes in a close second. Currently, 
maintaining or restoring peace is conceptually distinct from preventing 
violations of international criminal law, but when the ICC begins to exercise its 
new jurisdiction over aggression the differences with prevention will mostly 
disappear. At that point, they will essentially be the same goal. 
